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OVERVIEW 
 
 
MIKE CALLAGHAN
1
 
 
This issue of the G20 Monitor contains papers dealing with the role of 
the G20 in the following areas: strengthening international institutions, 
introducing ex ante regulatory impact statements when considering new 
financial regulations, and trade liberalisation. Also included is a report on 
the G20 conference hosted by the G20 Studies Centre in June 2014 on 
‘Strengthening Accountability and Effectiveness’. With the Brisbane 
Summit fast approaching, the G20 faces immense challenges. Ivan 
Oliveira sums it up clearly in the opening sentence in his paper: 
 
In a gloomy scenario for the world economy and its governance 
structures, circumscribed by an increasingly complex geopolitical 
framework, G20 leaders meeting in Brisbane next November will have a 
much harder task than they thought they would some months ago. 
 
 
G20 AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
 
My paper focuses on the role that the G20 should play in ensuring that 
the international economic institutions are effective. This should be a 
fundamental objective if the G20 is the premier forum for international 
economic cooperation. Moreover, the G20 will require effective 
international bodies if it is to be successful in its aim of increasing global 
economic growth. The G20 should ensure that the representation and 
governance arrangements of the institutions are appropriate and that 
their mandates adapt to meet the needs of an increasingly integrated 
global economy. 
 
There are some specific measures that the G20 should be addressing 
with respect to the key international economic institutions. These include: 
their surveillance function, quota and governance reform, regulatory 
impact assessments by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and financial 
standard-setting bodies, the tax agenda, the future of the WTO, and 
international energy governance. 
 
In order to strengthen the surveillance functions of the IMF, OECD, and 
World Bank, the G20 should invite these bodies to play an active and 
ongoing role in providing oversight of the development and 
implementation of growth strategies by G20 members. While continuing 
to push for the implementation of quota and governance reforms in the 
IMF, the G20 should not be fixated on making progress, given the 
continuing failure by the US Congress to pass the agreed measures. But 
it should ensure that the delay is not adversely impacting the operations 
 
 
1 
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of the IMF. In particular, the G20 should ensure that the Fund is even- 
handed in terms of access to its resources and its surveillance functions. 
 
In addition to taking steps to improve the representation arrangements in 
the FSB, the G20 should focus on improving the way that the FSB, and 
the financial standard-setting bodies, approach their work. For example, 
principles should be introduced for considering new international 
financial regulations, incorporating mandatory cost-benefit analysis, 
assessment of implementation difficulties, comprehensive consultation, 
and an assessment of alternative approaches. Martin Joy’s paper on 
financial regulation focuses on one particular aspect of this issue, 
namely the importance of ex ante regulatory impact assessments when 
considering new financial regulations. 
 
Combating tax evasion and avoidance is a key G20 priority and the 
G20/OECD initiative on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) is an 
important aspect of this exercise. However, ensuring that the 
international tax arrangements are appropriate for globally operating 
businesses is an ongoing exercise. At the end of the existing timetable 
for the BEPS action plan, the world cannot revert to an OECD-centric 
approach to dealing with international tax issues. The institutional 
framework for addressing international tax spillovers needs to be 
strengthened. It needs to be more representative and incorporate 
mechanisms to more directly involve developing countries in the 
negotiations. The G20 should be advancing discussions regarding 
permanent changes to the institutional arrangements for dealing with 
international tax issues. 
 
Trade liberalisation must be at the heart of the G20’s growth agenda. 
After 12 protracted years negotiating the Doha round, the agreement 
reached by WTO ministers in Bali in December 2013 was viewed as 
breathing life back into the WTO. However, India’s veto of technical 
changes by the WTO to advance the trade facilitation aspect of the 
agreement reached at Bali has thrown doubt over the future of the WTO. 
Given that the global economy has prospered under a rules-based 
global trading system administered by the WTO, particularly in dealing 
with trade disputes, a G20 priority should be strengthening the WTO. 
The importance of the G20 boosting the role of the WTO and the global 
trading system is picked up in more detail in Ivan Oliveira’s paper. 
 
International energy governance has not kept pace with changes in the 
global economy and no international agency currently brings together all 
of the major players on an equal basis for the specific purpose of 
strengthening cooperation on energy. One outcome from the Brisbane 
Summit should be the explicit acknowledgement of the need for a global 
forum that focuses on global energy challenges and brings together all 
the major countries that will most heavily rely on global energy markets 
in the twenty-first century. 
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THE G20: FINANCIAL REGULATION AND 
REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 
 
The importance of committing to ex ante regulatory impact assessments 
before introducing new financial regulations is one of the issues raised in 
my paper when discussing the reform of the FSB and covered in detail in 
Martin Joy’s paper. Joy advocates that the G20 should commit to the use 
of such assessments, along with considering the costs and benefits 
associated with any application of domestic financial regulation to non- 
domestic entities (that is, taking into account the extra-territorial impact of 
new regulations). 
 
Joy points out that neither the FSB nor the standard-setting bodies have 
consistently undertaken ex ante assessments of the costs and benefits 
of financial regulations before they have been introduced. The most 
commonly used assessment measure by the FSB has been public 
exposure of proposed standards through consultation processes. To 
help improve the regulatory process, Joy suggests that an ex ante cost- 
benefit analysis should be performed as early as possible in the policy- 
making process and made available for public comment. He also 
proposes that the assessments should follow the OECD recommended 
approach. This includes undertaking a cost-benefit assessment that 
takes into account the welfare impacts of regulation, identifying the 
specific ‘policy needs’ being addressed by the regulation, considering 
alternative ways of meeting the policy objectives, assessing proposals 
including quantification of the costs, benefits, and risks wherever 
possible, and incorporating the analysis as part of the consultation 
arrangements. 
 
Joy’s proposals are consistent with some of the recommendations on 
financial regulation made by the B20.
2 
In particular, the B20 has 
suggested that the G20 introduce high-level guiding principles for 
proposed  new  financial  standards,  including  mandatory  cost-benefit 
assessments and better approaches towards consultation. 
 
 
THE TRADE AGENDA AT THE BRISBANE SUMMIT: A 
CRUCIAL MOMENT 
 
As noted, Ivan Oliveira’s paper focuses on the importance of the G20 in 
strengthening the role and future of the WTO. This is particularly 
important in the wake of the recent stalemate in implementing the Bali 
Package and the  consequential lowering of expectations about  the 
prospects of concluding the Doha Round of trade talks. Oliveira notes 
that this stalemate is a result of actions by G20 members and that this 
brings into question the overall commitment to cooperation within the 
forum. Consequently, the next G20 summit must restore faith in the 
 
2 
Robert Milliner, “Unlocking Private Sector Led Growth and Investment,” in G20 Monitor 
No. 9: G20 2014 - Perspectives from Business, Civil Society, Labour, Think Tanks and 
Youth (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2014). 
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global trading system and in the future of the WTO, not only for the sake 
of the WTO but for the G20 itself. 
 
Oliveira suggests a number of steps that G20 members should take in 
Brisbane. These include: making a definitive commitment to implement 
the Bali Package, defining an agenda for concluding the Doha Round, 
establishing a common approach to the role that the WTO can play in 
the global trading system in the future (particularly focused on advancing 
plurilateral trade agreements), and reinforcing the role of the WTO in 
monitoring the roll-back of protectionist measures by G20 members. 
 
 
G20 CONFERENCE: STRENGTHENING 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Daniela Strube’s paper summarises the key points discussed at the 
conference dealing with strengthening the accountability and 
effectiveness of the G20, which was hosted by the G20 Studies Centre 
on 25 June 2014. The aim of the conference was to ascertain how key 
G20 stakeholders, in particular international organisations, business and 
labour, as well as civil society and think tanks, could complement 
member countries in making the G20 more efficient, accountable, and 
responsive in meeting global challenges. 
 
Discussions at the conference focused on a number of main issues. 
These included: the fact that a focused and integrated agenda is of 
utmost importance to the G20; that the level of public commitment by 
G20 leaders is the most important predictor of the success of a summit; 
that engaging domestic constituencies in the G20 process is essential to 
strengthening the G20; that there is a need to strengthen the input of 
new ideas into the G20 process. Here, there is a role that can be played 
by think tanks and international organisations, and further efforts are 
required to strengthen Asian participation in the G20’s engagement 
mechanisms. Some officials noted that they feel the G20’s culture of 
cooperation is improving. In addition, discussions highlighted that 
neglected areas on the G20 agenda include climate change, ageing and 
inclusive growth. 
 
The general feedback from participants was that the conference 
addressed many important issues and the active involvement of the 
various stakeholders in the G20 process was greatly appreciated by all. 
 
 
ANTI-CORRUPTION 
 
AJ Brown’s paper canvasses why anti-corruption remains a vital element 
of the G20 leaders’ agenda. In doing so, he focuses on what the next 
G20 Anti-Corruption Plan should contain. He draws on the 
recommendations that have been made by the various G20 engagement 
partners — business (B20), civil society (C20), the labour movement 
(L20), youth (Y20), and think tanks (T20). Brown concentrates on three 
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priorities identified in the recommendations: transparency of corporate 
(beneficial) ownership, foreign bribery and other corruption law 
enforcement, and whistle-blower protection. 
 
Brown highlights that anti-corruption should not be seen as a stand- 
alone item on the G20 agenda, but as a core component for attaining the 
overarching G20 objectives of increasing global growth and maintaining 
financial integrity and resilience. For example, corruption constitutes a 
direct drain on growth by diverting resources (such as the theft of public 
monies), driving up costs, increasing uncertainty and barriers to entry 
(through bribery), and distorting public policy and markets away from 
rational public-interest principles. Brown does not support, however, 
mainstreaming or diffusing the anti-corruption agenda into the other work 
streams of the G20. He argues that this could relegate key governance 
issues to second-order status. In contrast, he advocates a more 
integrated governance reform agenda supporting a more streamlined 
G20 agenda overall. His bottom line is that efforts to suppress corruption 
and maximise integrity within the G20 are here to stay. 
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G20 AND STRENGTHENING 
THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
MIKE CALLAGHAN
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
To be effective, the 
institutions must be 
perceived by all as being 
legitimate, and this in 
turn requires that their 
governance structures 
respond to changes in 
the relative weight of 
economies, in particular 
the rise of the emerging 
market economies. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In an increasingly integrated global economy, effective multilateral 
economic institutions are essential. They are the underlying plumbing of 
global governance and the key players if globalisation is going to work 
for all. The mandates for these institutions must remain relevant to a 
rapidly changing global economy, but at the same time they must avoid 
mission creep. To be effective, the institutions must be perceived by all 
as being legitimate, and this in turn requires that their governance 
structures respond to changes in the relative weight of economies, in 
particular the rise of the emerging market economies. While they must 
be representative, this cannot be at the expense of effective and timely 
decision-making. They must avoid international political gridlock. 
 
If the G20 is to be a global economic steering committee, then one of its 
main roles should be to help ensure that international institutions adapt 
to global changes and are effective. In turn, for the G20 to be successful 
in its aim to increase global growth, it will require effective international 
institutions. 
 
 
AN INTEGRATED GLOBAL ECONOMY 
 
The financial crisis demonstrated the close interconnection between 
financial markets. Financial institutions increasingly operate globally. 
Cross-border bank claims have risen from $US6 trillion in 1990 to over 
$US30 trillion in 2008.
2 
This is a rise of over 250 per cent as a share of 
global GDP. The rapid growth in international capital flows has brought 
many benefits, such as better international allocation of savings and 
investment. But such flows can be volatile and result in  the faster 
international transmission of shocks. The global crisis demonstrated that 
greater attention has to be paid to the linkages among economies and 
the impact of one country’s policy on others. 
 
Another expression of the integration of the global economy is the rise of 
global value chains. The growing fragmentation of production across 
national borders highlights the importance of open trade and investment 
regimes, because protective and restrictive barriers impact not only 
 
1 
Director, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
2 
Nemat Shafik, “Smart Governance: Solutions for Today’s Global Economy,” (speech, 
Oxford, 5 December 2013), IMF, www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/120513.htm. 
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foreign suppliers, but also domestic producers. With goods now 
effectively ‘made in the world’ rather than solely in one country, the 
approach to trade policy has to change. The mercantilist view that 
exports are good and imports are bad, and that market access 
concessions should only be granted in exchange for access to another 
country’s market, is out of date. Domestic firms depend on reliable 
access to imports of goods and services to improve their productivity, 
competitiveness, and opportunity to export. 
 
International tax laws also have to adapt to a changed global 
marketplace. In a world where firms are increasingly operating globally 
and production processes are widely dispersed, along with the 
increasing provision of goods and services through the internet, it is 
increasingly difficult for a jurisdiction to identify where its taxing rights 
exist, and very easy for corporations to ensure that profits are only 
declared in low-tax jurisdictions. 
 
 
AN INTEGRATED GLOBAL ECONOMY REQUIRES 
EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
No one country operating alone can effectively respond to the 
challenges posed by an increasingly integrated global economy. 
Individual nation states will find it increasingly difficult to ignore the 
policies of other countries and to set laws covering globally operating 
businesses. Effective international cooperation will become more and 
more important. The world will need forums such as the G20 to provide 
political economic leadership and promote greater economic 
cooperation. The G20 is not an institution, however, and has no standing 
secretariat. It is essentially a political forum involving a meeting  of 
leaders from systemically important economies. Its main strength is that 
leaders can provide political momentum to deal with pressing global 
economic issues and its members can commit to pursue national 
policies which will benefit all countries. But the G20 needs effective 
international institutions to take forward its commitments and to deliver 
its objectives. 
 
An integrated global economy requires effective multilateral economic 
institutions. The importance of international institutions to the pursuit of 
economic growth and financial stability was recognised with the 
establishment of the Bretton Woods Institutions in 1944 — the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In the area of 
trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) commenced 
in 1948, replaced by the World Trade Organization in 1985. To advance 
international efforts to promote strengthened financial markets, the G20 
sponsored the establishment of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 
2009. Comprehensive international institutions do not exist in the area of 
tax and energy, although the OECD has taken the lead in the former and 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) is the most prominent body in the 
area of energy governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But the G20 needs 
effective international 
institutions to take 
forward its commitments 
and to deliver its 
objectives. 
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The world has changed greatly from when most of these institutions 
were established. The institutions must change accordingly if they are to 
remain relevant and effective. But there appears to be significant inertia 
when it comes to reforming global bodies. Transitions and shifts in 
relative economic power may not be smooth. For some countries to 
have more power and influence in these institutions, others have to have 
less. It is therefore not surprising that changes in the governance 
arrangements in international institutions are protracted and contentious. 
Overcoming such political roadblocks is a major contribution that the 
G20 can, and has, provided. In particular, the G20 has sought to 
advance governance reform in the IMF and the World Bank, seeking to 
change their quota and shareholding arrangements so that they better 
reflect the rise of rapidly growing emerging markets. While changes to 
the World Bank shareholding have been implemented, a package of 
reforms to IMF governance agreed by the G20 in 2010 is still awaiting 
passage by the United States Congress before they can be 
implemented. 
 
It is important, however, that the G20 renews and increases its focus on 
ensuring that the international institutions are operating effectively and 
efficiently. Specifically, the actions that G20 members take in Brisbane in 
terms of showing how they will follow through and deliver on their multi- 
year commitments can not only bolster the credibility of the G20, but 
they can help strengthen the standing and effectiveness of the 
international institutions. (This is in part because the need for reform in 
G20 economies that led to the growth strategies initiative is based on 
assessment and analysis by international institutions such as the IMF, 
the OECD and the World Bank). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…inviting these 
institutions… to play an 
active role in providing 
oversight of the 
development and 
implementation of the 
G20 country growth 
plans. 
STRENGTHENING SURVEILLANCE BY THE IMF AND 
OECD 
 
A core activity of the IMF and OECD is undertaking surveillance of 
members’ economies. In particular, IMF staff continually monitor 
members’ economies. This includes annual visits to discuss with 
authorities how the member’s economy is performing, and whether there 
are risks to domestic and global stability. They recommend policy 
adjustments to lift the member’s economic performance. The OECD also 
surveys and conducts economic surveillance of its member economies. 
In addition, the IMF monitors global and regional economic trends and 
identifies spillovers from members’ policies to the global economy. In 
today’s globalised world, where the actions of one country can have 
significant repercussions for others, effective economic surveillance is 
important. But the IMF now struggles to gain traction with its policy 
advice, particularly in the major economies. 
 
The G20 could strengthen the effectiveness of the surveillance operation 
of the IMF and OECD by inviting these institutions, along with the World 
Bank, to play an active role in providing oversight of the development 
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and implementation of the G20 country growth plans (aimed at 
increasing global growth by an extra 2 per cent over five years). G20 
finance ministers and central bank governors adopted this objective at 
their meeting in February  2014 and undertook to submit individual 
growth strategies consistent with obtaining this objective at the Brisbane 
Summit.
3   
This  growth  ‘target’  comes  from  an  assessment  by  the 
international institutions that with additional country specific reforms, the 
global economy could expand by an extra $US2.5 trillion by 2018.
4
 
 
One factor that has inhibited the effectiveness of IMF surveillance has 
been concern by many countries, particularly emerging markets and 
developing countries, that they are underrepresented in the Fund’s quota 
and governance arrangements. A perception shared by many in these 
countries is that there is a bias in IMF surveillance in favour of the large 
advanced countries that are the main shareholders in the Fund. As 
noted, the G20 has agreed to reforms to IMF quota and governance 
arrangements, but these are being blocked by the US Congress. These 
reforms are important, but the proposed shift in quota shares from 
advanced markets to emerging markets and developing countries is 
modest, only 2.8 percentage points.
5 
The blocked package of reforms is, 
however, intended to be part of bigger changes to come. Part of the 
reform involves a review of the formula used to determine quota 
allocations and an acceleration of the next general review of quotas. 
This is expected to produce larger shifts in quota shares to emerging 
markets. The other key aspects of the reforms are a move to an all- 
elected IMF Executive Board, and Europe agreeing to give up two of its 
chairs on the Board in favour of developing countries. 
 
The delay in advancing the IMF reforms is unfortunate and frustrating, 
damaging the credibility of the IMF and G20. This frustration has, in part, 
contributed to the move by Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa to 
establish a New Development Bank — often simply referred to as the 
‘BRICS’ Bank’— that combines features of the World Bank and the IMF. 
The G20 has to be more responsive in accommodating the concerns of 
emerging markets. While the G20 should continue to press the United 
States to pass the governance reforms, the G20 should not become 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The delay in advancing 
the IMF reforms is 
unfortunate and 
frustrating, damaging the 
credibility of the IMF and 
G20. 
 
 
3 
G20, “Communiqué of Meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors, Sydney, Australia, February 23, 2014,” (Sydney, 23 February 2014), 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014-0223-finance.html. 
4 
IMF Staff with Inputs from the OECD and World Bank, “Macroeconomic Reform 
Priorities,” February 2014, 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/G- 
20%20Macroeconomic%20Reform%20Priorities%20Report%20Feb%2012%202014.pd 
f. 
5 
IMF, “Fourteenth General Review of Quotas  — Realigning Quota Shares: Initial 
Considerations, 
Supplement, Statistical Appendix, and The Chairman’s Concluding Remarks,” 
(Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 4 March 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/030410a.pdf. 
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‘stuck’ if there are ongoing delays by the United States. It should rather 
be proactive and ensure that the failure to advance the governance 
reforms is in no way  impacting the operations of the IMF and, in 
particular, ensure that the Fund’s surveillance (along with access to 
resources) is even-handed and is not biased towards any group of 
countries. Given the perceptions that IMF surveillance has favoured the 
large economies, a move by G20 members that demonstrates that they 
are responsive to IMF advice would be a significant step in strengthening 
the Fund and the credibility of the G20. 
 
 
IMPROVING THE FSB’S GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Strengthening financial sector regulatory arrangements has been a 
major focus of the G20 since the crisis in 2008. The G20 transformed the 
Financial Stability Forum into the Financial Stability Board in 2009, 
expanded its membership to cover all G20 countries, and endorsed an 
expansion in the size of its secretariat. Since 2008, the FSB has 
launched a host of wide-ranging regulatory reforms and has introduced a 
series of regional consultative forums. G20 finance ministers have 
indicated that the priority in 2014 is to complete, by the Brisbane 
Summit, key aspects of the financial regulatory reforms in four areas: 
building resilient financial institutions (through Basel III), ending too-big- 
to-fail, addressing shadow banking risks, and making derivative markets 
safer.
6  
Given the magnitude of regulatory changes launched since the 
crisis in 2008, it is not surprising that there is a strong appetite among 
both regulators and the finance sector to consolidate rather than extend 
reform initiatives.
7
 
 
 
 
...the task of providing 
oversight to the 
international financial 
system will never be 
‘completed’. 
While the focus of the G20 in 2014 is to encourage the FSB to finalise 
the core design phase of important regulatory reforms by the Brisbane 
Summit, the task of providing oversight to the international financial 
system will never be ‘completed’. Given the ongoing task of improving 
international financial regulatory standards, along with the 
implementation of these standards, the G20 should be focusing on 
strengthening the governance and operations of the FSB. Towards that 
end, it is appropriate that the FSB is considering options to improve 
country representation and will provide a report on this issue at the 
Brisbane Summit. The current concern is that while the larger G20 
countries have three representatives at the FSB plenary meetings, 
others have either two or one representative. This has been a source of 
concern for countries with more limited representation. The review of 
representation must establish mutual confidence and trust. It is essential 
that not only all members, but also non-members, have confidence and 
trust in the FSB. 
 
 
6 
G20, “Communiqué.” 
7 
Milliner, “Unlocking Private Sector Led Growth and Investment.” 
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In addition to improving the FSB’s representation arrangements, the G20 
should also focus on improving the way the FSB, along with the financial 
standard-setting bodies, approach their work.  For example, the 
Business20 (B20) has proposed that high-level guiding principles should 
be adopted, including better approaches towards consultation on 
proposed new standards. The B20 has suggested that these principles 
could be based around the need for: a clear mandate for a new or 
enhanced regulation, mandatory cost-benefit analysis of proposed 
regulation, an assessment of the difficulty of implementing regulation 
before it is introduced, and consideration of alternatives such as greater 
discretion for regulators. The B20 has also identified a need for improved 
arrangements to take into account the needs of emerging markets.
8 
This 
is a pressing issue. The regulatory response through the FSB primarily 
reflects the experience and views of Europe and North America. But as 
the B20 has noted “it is important that international regulators properly 
consider financial systems that are at different stages of development or 
have fundamentally different characteristics when designing new global 
rules.”
9
 
 
As part of strengthening the FSB, the G20 needs to improve its oversight 
of financial regulatory issues, including clarifying its relationship with the 
FSB. Specifically, while the FSB focuses on the detail of new regulatory 
measures, establishing timetables for their adoption, and monitoring 
progress with their implementation, the G20 should be dealing with high- 
order issues. This could include whether the prioritisation for developing 
new standards is appropriate as well as likely changes in the structure of 
the financial system as  a result of the regulatory measures. Other 
aspects that need to be considered include progress in obtaining the 
balance between financial stability and promoting economic growth, and 
whether there are unintended consequences from the regulation. The 
G20 should also be  active  in ensuring  that the  views of  emerging 
markets are being adequately taken into account. 
 
 
A NEW FORUM IS NEEDED FOR DEALING WITH 
INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES 
 
Combating tax evasion and avoidance is a G20 priority. A particular 
focus is dealing with base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) — the 
capacity of globally operating firms to shift profits to low or no tax 
jurisdictions. In July 2013, at the request of the G20, the OECD released 
a 15-point action plan focused on addressing BEPS. It also announced a 
timetable: the completion of a number of the actions by September 2014, 
with the remainder of the plan to be finished by September 2015. 
 
While the OECD’s BEPS action plan is an important initiative, and the 
G20 has a critical role in maintaining political momentum on combating 
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Ibid. 
9 
Ibid. 
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tax avoidance, it is a complex and ongoing issue that essentially involves 
ensuring that international tax laws keep up with a rapidly changing 
global environment. This has resulted in the questioning of some basic 
international tax principles. The issue will not be ‘solved’ with the 
completion of the current timetable of OECD reports on BEPS. The 
BEPS project should be seen as the start of a fundamental change in the 
governance arrangements for dealing with international tax issues, and 
the G20 should be at the forefront of embracing and supporting this 
change. 
 
 
…the case for an 
inclusive and less 
piecemeal approach to 
international tax 
cooperation grows. 
 
The IMF recently noted that “the institutional framework for addressing 
international tax spillovers is weak. As the strength and pervasiveness of 
tax spillovers becomes increasingly apparent, the case for an inclusive 
and less piecemeal approach to international tax cooperation grows.”
10
 
The OECD has traditionally been the source of expertise on international 
tax issues, and the focus of its work has been on bilateral tax treaties 
and standards for avoiding abusive transfer pricing. The United Nations 
has played a much smaller role in the area of international tax. The 
BEPS action plan has been extended beyond OECD members and is 
presented as an OECD/G20 initiative with the non-OECD G20 members 
participating in the negotiations as equal members. This has to be an 
ongoing process. At the end of the existing timetable for the BEPS action 
plan, set for 15 September 2015, the world cannot revert to an OECD- 
centric approach to dealing with international tax issues. 
 
While non-OECD G20 members are participating on a basis equal to 
OECD members in the BEPS project, developing countries have 
expressed concern that they are not directly involved in the negotiations. 
This is despite the fact that developing countries are more adversely 
impacted by base erosion than the advanced economies.
11 
As the IMF 
notes: 
 
the spillover base effect is largest for developing countries. 
Compared to OECD countries, the base spillovers from others’ 
tax rates are two to three times larger, and statistically more 
significant … The apparent revenue loss from spillovers … is 
also largest for developing countries.
12
 
 
The G20 should begin a discussion around more permanent changes to 
the arrangements for dealing with international tax issues. This should 
include not only formalising the participation of non-OECD G20 
members beyond the timetable for the current BEPS initiative, but also 
establishing mechanisms to more actively and directly involve 
developing countries. 
 
10 
IMF, Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation, IMF Policy Paper, (Washington 
DC: International Monetary Fund, 9 May 2014), 
www.imf.org/external/np/2014/050914.pdf. 
11 
Ibid. 
12 
Ibid. 
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STRENGTHENING THE WTO 
 
Trade liberalisation should be at the heart of the G20 growth agenda. As 
part of embracing the importance of trade to growth, G20 leaders should 
provide strategic direction regarding the future of the multilateral trading 
system and the WTO. The WTO’s regulations, dispute settlement 
strategies, and the work of its administration have become crucial to the 
management of international trade. However, the WTO does not have a 
successful record in advancing multilateral trade liberalisation. The 
lengthy nature of the Doha negotiations has seen trade liberalisation 
being pursued more through bilateral and regional trade agreements. 
There is a concern that mega-regional trade agreements — such as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Agreement (TTIP) — will see trade rules increasingly 
balkanised and unequal. These regional trade agreements are 
discriminatory, especially against developing countries who are not 
members. For decades, developing countries have benefited from 
progressive trade liberalisation driven by developed economies. 
 
After twelve years of protracted negotiations over the Doha round of 
multilateral trade liberalisation, the WTO reached its first liberalisation 
agreement in Bali in December 2013. This agreement was viewed as 
breathing life back into the WTO and its ability to advance multilateral 
trade liberalisation. However, India’s veto against technical changes to 
advance the Bali agreement on trade facilitation to be made by the WTO 
by 31 July 2014 (a deadline set by WTO trade ministers) has thrown 
doubt over the future of the multilateral trading system and the WTO. 
Notwithstanding India’s position, which hopefully will be reversed, the 
G20 must press on in advancing trade liberalisation and must reinforce 
the future of the WTO. This is essential if the G20 truly is the premier 
forum for international economic cooperation and is operating as a 
global economic steering committee. 
 
G20 leaders can play a major role in liberalising global trade and 
strengthening the role of the WTO. At the Brisbane Summit, G20 
members should commit to roll back protectionist measures introduced 
since the crisis. As noted by the Australian G20 presidency, protectionist 
measures are on the rise, with 407 new measures introduced last year, 
up from 308 measures the previous year.
13 
The G20 should go further 
and commit to roll back non-tariff measures, as identified by several 
international organisations. It should also ask the WTO to monitor and 
report on progress in the rollback of these protectionist pressures and 
commit to discussing these reports at the next leaders’ meeting. The 
G20 chair should also seek commitments from G20 members for the 
early implementation of the Bali trade facilitation agreement. G20 
members should not wait for the formal ratification of the agreement, but 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G20 must press on in 
advancing trade 
liberalisation and must 
reinforce the future of the 
WTO. 
 
 
13 
G20, “Removing obstacles to trade,” (2013), 
https://www.g20.org/g20_priorities/g20_2014_agenda/removing_obstacles_trade. 
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rather include in their growth strategies the steps they will take to enable 
the rapid implementation of the measures contained in the agreement. In 
addition, they should commit to providing the necessary assistance to 
developing countries for implementing the trade facilitation agreement. 
 
 
…the G20 should go 
further and set a 
strategic direction for the 
future of the WTO. 
 
Elevating the role of the WTO in monitoring the G20 members’ progress 
in liberalising trade would help promote the standing of the organisation, 
but the G20 should go further and set a strategic direction for the future 
of the WTO. As noted, this is particularly important given that India’s 
actions have brought into question the future of the WTO. The time has 
come to consider multilateral trade liberalisation in a post-Doha world 
and the G20 should start this discussion. Negotiations in a post-Doha 
world should avoid repeating the ambitious and wide-ranging Doha 
agenda — a single undertaking where ‘nothing is agreed until everything 
is agreed’. Negotiations should instead target specific areas and allow 
for plurilateral agreements in which WTO members can opt into joining 
the agreement. The discussions over the future of the WTO should be 
anchored around the governance and implications of global value 
chains. Such an approach by the G20 would bolster the future of the 
WTO. 
 
 
STRENGTHENING GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE 
 
International energy governance has not kept pace with changes in the 
global economy,  particularly the  changing relations between oil 
producers and consumers. The ‘global energy governance system’ in 
2014 is fragmented, byzantine, inflexible to new energy problems, and 
does not adequately bring together the needs of major emerging 
markets and advanced countries. Progressing  from the current 
unsatisfactory situation to establishing an energy governance framework 
fit for dealing with the challenges of the twenty-first century will only 
happen if world leaders from major energy producer and consumer 
countries reach a common understanding on why such an outcome is 
politically desirable, how their citizens would benefit, and what they can 
actually do to assist. 
 
Energy governance bodies, such as the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), were originally composed of the world’s major oil importers and 
exporters respectively. However, their mandates and membership are 
becoming increasingly misaligned given changes in the global energy 
market and a number of looming challenges. These include the 
considerable increase in energy demand driven by the demographic and 
economic shifts in non-OECD countries, major oil and gas importers 
becoming exporters, major exporters consuming more energy than 
some importers, and many smaller players disrupting energy supply and 
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demand channels as their market influence grows over time.
14 
Other 
relevant factors and risks include changing patterns of industrialisation, 
power generation, and distribution, the volatility of energy pricing, as well 
as technological innovation within the energy sector — typified by the 
falling cost of renewable power generation technologies and the new 
means of tapping previously inaccessible shale, coal seam, and tight gas 
resources. 
 
No agency currently brings together all of the major players, on an equal 
basis, for the specific purpose of strengthening cooperation on energy. 
The IEA could be elevated into a role that allows it to address most of 
the global energy challenges. However, to do so, it must become more 
inclusive of emerging markets and less anchored to its traditional 
concentration on oil and gas commodities. In particular, it would have to 
abandon the criterion that only OECD countries can be members of the 
IEA. If there is not a political push for IEA reform, major emerging 
economies may seek to advance alternative models. 
 
An advantage of the G20 is that it brings together the leaders of the 
major economies and provides the opportunity for political input to deal 
with pressing global economic issues. The need for enhanced global 
energy governance is an issue that should be on the agenda for G20 
leaders. However, while the G20 currently has a number of energy 
issues on its work program, it does not have the  specific issue of 
enhancing global energy governance. One outcome from the Brisbane 
Summit should be the explicit acknowledgement of the need for a global 
forum that focuses on global energy challenges. This forum should bring 
together all the major countries that will most heavily rely upon global 
energy markets in the twenty-first century, on an equal basis. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The credibility and legitimacy of the G20 will depend on the extent to 
which it delivers on its commitments. However, they are multi-year 
issues that will not be resolved at one summit or in one year. To bolster 
credibility, the G20 has to demonstrate how it will deliver and be 
accountable for its undertakings. The key to this is demonstrating how 
the G20 is strengthening the international institutions which are the 
‘plumbing’ or foundation of international economic governance. 
Specifically, the G20 should strengthen the surveillance operations of 
the IMF, OECD, and World Bank by emphasising the role of these 
institutions in monitoring whether G20 members are delivering on their 
global growth objective. The G20 should also strengthen the role of the 
WTO in advancing multilateral trade liberalisation and bring the 
governance arrangements for dealing with international tax, energy, and 
financial regulation into the twenty-first century. If the G20 is to be the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The need for enhanced 
global energy 
governance is an issue 
that should be on the 
agenda for G20 leaders. 
 
14 
International Energy Agency, "World Energy Outlook 2013," 12 November 2013, 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/publications/weo-2013/. 
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steering committee for the global economy, it must strengthen the role of 
the international economic institutions. 
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THE G20, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION, AND 
REGULATORY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENTS 
 
 
MARTIN JOY
1
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Earlier this year, the chairman of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
wrote to the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors on the 
progress and challenges of implementing the G20’s reform agenda on 
financial regulation.
2  
In his letter, Chairman Carney set out two key 
recommendations (among others). First, the FSB recommended that the 
G20 commit to (ex post facto) impact assessments to refine standards 
“when we get them wrong.”
3 
Second, the FSB recommended “enhanced 
co-operation to avoid domestic measures that fragment the global 
system.”
4 
This would include “assessment of whether there are any spill- 
overs of national regulatory policy initiatives that could be harmful to the 
objective of an open, integrated system.”
5
 
 
These are laudable recommendations. The G20’s regulatory reform 
agenda is vitally important to a resilient global financial market that 
efficiently allocates capital and risk with the ultimate objective of fostering 
economic growth. Where agreed reforms are not appropriately calibrated 
to achieve this, they should be adjusted. Further, uncoordinated 
domestic implementation of reforms carries the risk of fragmenting the 
global market.
6  
This needs to be prevented, again to make sure that 
economic growth is not compromised. 
 
…the G20 should go 
further and set a 
strategic direction for the 
future of the WTO. 
 
 
1 
Director, Deloitte Australia. The views in this paper are Martin’s own, and not those of 
Deloitte, ASIC or Monash University. 
2 
Mark Carney, “Letter from the Financial Stability Board to the G20 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors,” (Basel: Financial Stability Board, 17 February 2014), 
https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_140222.pdf. 
3 
Ibid. 
4 
Ibid. 
5 
Ibid. 
6 
The main arena in which this fragmentation is occurring currently is the OTC derivative 
markets. The OTC Derivatives Regulators Group (ODRG) is currently working at 
resolving issues arising from the interplay between national implementation strategies of 
the OTC derivative reforms. At their Saint Petersburg Summit, the G20 Leaders called 
on the ODRG to resolve these issues. See G20, “G20 Leaders' Declaration, St 
Petersburg,” (Saint Petersburg, 6 September 2013), 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html. A progress report of the 
ODRG was delivered to the G20 in March 2014. See: G20, “ODRG - Report of the OTC 
Derivatives Regulators Group on Cross-Border Implementation Issues,” (March 2014), 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Report%20of%20the%20O 
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…each G20 member 
should commit to using 
domestic ex ante 
regulatory impact 
assessments to consider 
the costs and benefits 
associated with any 
application of its 
domestic financial 
regulation to non- 
domestic entities. 
This paper suggests that these recommendations could be enhanced in 
two ways. Both involve the G20 committing to the use of ex ante 
regulatory impact assessments. First, the G20 should commit to the FSB 
and the standard-setting bodies (SSBs)
7  
using the ex ante regulatory 
impact assessments recommended by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) for domestic regulatory 
processes during the development of any new international standards.
8 
This could be expected to increase the quality of the FSB’s and SSBs’ 
regulatory standards and their public accountability. Such a commitment 
would build on the FSB’s recommendation for impact assessments of 
reforms after they have been implemented. Second, each G20 member 
should commit to using domestic ex ante regulatory impact assessments 
to consider the costs and benefits associated with any application of its 
domestic financial regulation to non-domestic entities.
9  
This would aid 
domestic agencies to understand the extra-territorial impact of their 
proposals, particularly when extra-territorial costs are additive to costs 
imposed by the domestic regulation of other nations. This would give 
G20 members an additional process that seeks to assess and avoid 
spillovers of national regulation that are harmful to an open, integrated 
system. 
 
Ex ante regulatory impact assessment covers a variety of techniques. As 
explained below, the OECD has recommended that it involve ex ante 
cost-benefit analysis that is applied to a range of policy options (including 
the option of doing nothing).
10  
This analysis should be performed as 
early as possible in the policy-making process and made available for 
 
 
TC%20Derivatives%20Regulators%20Group%20on%20Cross- 
Border%20Implementation%20Issues.pdf. Beyond the immediate OTC derivative 
market issues, IOSCO is also working at resolving issues arising from the interplay of 
national regulations. It has established a Task Force on Cross Border Regulation that 
will seek to publish a tool kit of cross border regulation tools. This was announced in 
July 2013. See International Organization of Securities Commissions, “IOSCO Board 
focuses on behavioural economics and social media,” media release, 1 July 2013, 
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS286.pdf. 
7 
These bodies include IOSCO, BCBS, the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS). A 
full list of relevant standard-setting bodies can be found at: 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/wssb.htm. 
8 
See, most recently, OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and 
Governance, (Paris, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/49990817.pdf. 
9 
This type of argument has been raised by submissions to Australia’s Financial System 
Inquiry. See: Financial System Inquiry, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, 
(Sydney: Financial System Inquiry, July 2014), http://fsi.gov.au/publications/interim- 
report/. It has also been forwarded by Alemanno in the context of promoting regulatory 
harmonisation for the purposes of international trade law. See Alberto Alemanno, “Is 
There a Role for Cost-Benefit Analysis Beyond the Nation-State? Lessons from 
International Regulatory Cooperation” in The Globalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis in 
Environmental Policy, ed. Michael Livermore and Richard Revesz (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
10 
OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance. 
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comment. Such analysis should allow the policy option with the greatest 
expected net societal benefit to be adopted. 
 
Both of this paper’s suggestions concerning regulatory assessments 
represent enhancements of current international and domestic practices. 
At the international level, the FSB and SSBs have used limited forms of 
regulatory impact assessments in developing standards. But these have 
not been ex ante assessments of the type recommended by the OECD. 
At the domestic level, existing national guidance on regulatory impact 
assessments suggests taking into account some international factors 
(such as a proposal’s impact on international trade). This could be 
clarified to explicitly require the consideration of extra-territorial costs and 
benefits. 
 
This paper has four parts. The first part explains the OECD’s 
recommended regulatory impact assessments. The second sets out 
existing impact assessment practices of the FSB and SSBs. The third 
part highlights briefly how domestic impact assessments are encouraged 
to consider international factors. The fourth part explains the two 
suggestions made above and provides some thoughts about how the 
G20 and its members could incorporate them into their processes. 
 
 
WHAT IS REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT? 
 
In 2012, the OECD Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance 
recommended that OECD members incorporate regulatory impact 
assessments  into  the  “early  stages  of  the  policy  process  for  the 
formulation of new regulatory proposals.”
11  
Key points from the OECD 
Council’s fourth recommendation help us understand what good 
regulatory impact assessments would involve. Directed at OECD 
members, these include the following. First, members should: 
 
adopt ex ante impact assessment practices that … include benefit cost 
analyses that consider the welfare impacts of regulation taking into 
account economic, social and environmental impacts including the 
distributional effects over time, identifying who is likely to benefit and 
who is likely to bear costs. 
 
Second, the assessments should identify “specific policy” needs and the 
objective of the regulation. Third, the assessment should consider 
alternative ways of meeting the policy objectives. Importantly, 
 
[e]x ante assessment should in most cases identify approaches likely to 
deliver the  greatest net benefit to society, including complementary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…benefit cost analyses 
that consider the welfare 
impacts of regulation 
taking into account 
economic, social and 
environmental impacts. 
 
11 
Ibid. See recommendation 4 in particular. Regarding the make-up of the OECD 
membership, note that most G20 nation states are involved with the OECD. Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa are the G20 
nations that are not currently members of the OECD. However, in 2007, Russia was 
invited to open discussions for OECD membership and the OECD has offered 
‘enhanced engagement’ to Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa. 
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approaches such as through a combination of regulation, education and 
voluntary standards. 
 
Fourth, the assessment of proposals with significant impacts should 
include quantification of costs, benefits, and risks wherever possible. 
Where quantification is difficult or impossible, the assessment should 
provide qualitative descriptions of the impacts. Finally, the analysis 
should “as far as possible be made publicly available along with 
regulatory proposals.” It should be included as part of the consultation 
process.
12
 
 
 
…the role that regulatory 
impact assessments can 
play in considering the 
interplay between 
domestic regulatory 
proposals and existing 
non-domestic regulation. 
Recommendation twelve from the OECD builds on the above points by 
highlighting the importance of international standards in domestic 
regulatory impact assessments. It states that OECD members should 
“give consideration to all relevant international standards and 
frameworks for co-operation in the same field and, where appropriate, 
their likely effects on parties outside the jurisdiction.”
13  
Importantly, the 
OECD recommends that members “take into account relevant 
international regulatory settings when formulating regulatory proposals to 
foster global coherence” and “avoid the duplication of efforts in 
regulatory activity in cases where recognition of existing regulations and 
standards would achieve the same public interest objective at lower 
costs.”
14   
This  last  point  highlights  the  role  that  regulatory  impact 
assessments can play in considering the interplay between domestic 
regulatory proposals and existing non-domestic regulation. 
 
 
EX ANTE REGULATORY ASSESSMENT PRACTICES 
AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
 
Strengthening financial regulation in the aftermath of the crisis has been 
one of the G20’s primary focuses. In November 2008, the G20 leaders 
agreed to “implement reforms that will strengthen financial markets and 
regulatory regimes so as to avoid future crises.”
15 
Since then, the G20 
through the FSB and the SSBs has pursued an agenda of reforming the 
regulation of the world’s financial markets. This agenda has resulted in a 
significant compendium of regulatory standards for G20, FSB, and SSB 
members to implement within domestic frameworks.
16  
The FSB and 
 
12 
Ibid. 
13 
Ibid. See recommendation 12 in particular. 
14 
Ibid. 
15G20, “Declaration Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy,” 
(Washington DC, 15 November 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/resource- 
center/international/g7- 
g20/Documents/Washington%20Nov%20Leaders%20Declaration.pdf. See paragraph 8 
in particular. 
16 
This compendium is available at: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/. The 
commitment by FSB members to implement agreed international standards is found in 
Article 6(1)(c) of the Charter of the Financial Stability Board. See: Financial Stability 
Board, Charter of the Financial Stability Board, (Basel: Financial Stability Board, June 
2012), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120809.pdf. 
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SSBs have used a range of measures in the development of these 
standards to help understand the possible impact of their 
implementation. These measures are explained below. None, however, 
fully aligns with the OECD’s recommendations for domestic regulatory 
impact assessments. 
 
Before setting out these measures, it is important to recognise that the 
development of all FSB and SSB standards has benefited from the 
views of official sector experts who contribute to the FSB and SSBs. 
Indeed, the primary method that has been used to develop regulatory 
standards has been to draw on the experience and judgement of these 
individuals. The assessment  measures below, and this paper’s 
recommendations for further measures, are intended to enhance the 
impact of this experience and judgement by providing additional 
evidence for consideration. 
 
CONSULTATION 
 
The most commonly used assessment measure has been the public 
exposure of proposed standards through consultation processes. This 
allows stakeholders to comment on the possible impact of the standards 
and provides for some public accountability of the SSBs and FSB. 
 
Where this is the sole form of pre-adoption assessment however, it 
means that the proposed standards are not subjected to any form of 
systematic quantitative or qualitative assessment of their anticipated 
costs and benefits as recommended by the OECD. This is particularly 
disconcerting where the standards either purport to apply without the 
need for domestic implementation or where domestic authorities have 
little discretion in their implementation. For example, in July 2013, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) released 
the  Principles  for  Financial  Benchmarks  (Benchmark  Principles).
17
 
Developed in response to the LIBOR scandal, the Benchmark Principles 
are intended to address conflicts of interest, transparency, and openness 
in the administration of all financial market benchmarks.
18  
They have 
been endorsed by the G20 and the FSB.
19  
The Benchmark Principles 
were  developed  using  a   two-part  consultation  process.  Despite 
 
 
 
…public exposure of 
proposed standards 
through consultation 
processes. 
 
 
 
17 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, Principles for Financial 
Benchmarks — Final Report, (Madrid: International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, July 2013), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD415.pdf. 
18 
Ibid. 
19 
The endorsement by the G20 occurred at the Saint Petersburg G20 Leaders’ Summit. 
See: G20, “G20 Leaders' Declaration, St Petersburg,” (Saint Petersburg, 6 September 
2013), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html. See paragraph 72 
in particular. The endorsement of the FSB is noted in: Financial Stability Board,  
Progress Report on the Oversight and Governance Framework for Financial Benchmark 
Reform — Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, (Basel: 
Financial Stability Board, 29 August 2013), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829f.pdf. 
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commentators identifying the need for cost-benefit analysis, no such 
analysis was conducted prior to their adoption.
20
 
 
 
…the G20 has endorsed 
the application of 
regulation that has not 
been developed with the 
benefit of any 
quantitative or qualitative 
assessment beyond the 
judgement of SSB 
members. 
Released as ‘recommended practice’, IOSCO has stated that 
administrators of all benchmarks should publish the extent of their 
compliance with the Benchmark Principles by July 2014.
21 
Accordingly, 
benchmark administrators are expected to comply with the standards 
even though they have not been implemented through domestic law. 
This bypassing of domestic processes, which would likely include 
regulatory impact assessments, means that the G20 has endorsed the 
application of regulation that has not been developed with the benefit of 
any quantitative or qualitative assessment beyond the judgement of SSB 
members. This example highlights the need for rigorous ex ante 
regulatory impact assessments at the FSB and SSB levels. 
 
 
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT STUDIES 
 
In some cases, the consultation process has included or been followed 
by a quantitative impact study (QIS). These studies have typically sought 
to assess the likely financial impact of proposed  standards on the 
regulated entities. 
 
An example of this is the QIS that  was conducted  on the margin 
requirements for uncleared OTC derivatives, released by the  Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and IOSCO in mid-2013.
22 
The  requirements  were  developed  using  a  two-stage  consultation 
process. The second consultation asked for comments on the results of 
a QIS. This QIS sought to estimate how much additional margin affected 
institutions would need to hold under the proposed requirements.
23
 
 
When conducted without further analysis, the QIS process falls short of 
the OECD’s best practice for regulatory impact assessments and cost- 
benefit analysis.
24 
It simply attempts to quantify the expected compliance 
 
20 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, Principles for Financial 
Benchmarks. 
21 
See: International Organization of Securities Commissions, “Public Communiqué — 
Implementation of the Principles for Financial Benchmarks,” (30 October 2013), 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD429.pdf. 
22 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions, Margin Requirements for Non-centrally Cleared Derivatives, (Basel: Bank 
for International Settlements, September 2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs261.pdf. 
23 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, Second Consultative Document — Margin Requirements for Non- 
centrally Cleared Derivatives, (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, February 
2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs242.pdf. 
24 
The margin requirements for non-cleared OTC derivative transactions were included 
in the macroeconomic study on OTC derivative reforms noted below. An example of 
standards that have benefited from a QIS only (at least so far) is: Financial Stability 
Board, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Policy Framework 
for Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos, (Basel: 
Financial Stability Board, August 2013), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829b.pdf. 
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costs of the proposed standards. It does  not attempt to determine 
whether the likely net economic benefit of the proposed standards is 
optimal. This method may be defensible however, where the expected 
benefit of all possible policy options is identical and the only variable is 
the costs. 
 
 
NET ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
 
The examples of impact assessments that are closest to that 
recommended by the OECD have been those conducted by the FSB 
and SSBs on the expected net economic impact of the Basel III banking 
and OTC derivative reforms. In August 2010, the FSB and the BCBS 
released a report on the long-run economic effect of the then-proposed 
Basel III banking capital and liquidity reforms.
25 
The report attempted to 
quantify the economic output costs and benefits of the proposals. It did 
not, however, accompany the original Basel III proposals when they 
were released for comment in December 2009. Rather, it was released 
only months before the final Basel III standards were adopted by the 
BCBS and endorsed by the G20. This raises questions about how 
effective the study was in informing the policy design process. Further, 
the study does not seem to have benefited from a process of public 
criticism. Rather, it was released as a completed work. 
 
Similar criticisms can be made of the macroeconomic impact 
assessment that was released in August 2013 relating to the OTC 
derivatives reforms.
26 
Again, this was released after the (missed) end- 
2012 deadline imposed by the G20 for the implementation of the OTC 
derivatives reforms and at a point when many domestic and international 
work streams were finalising, or had finalised, the shape of the reform 
implementation.
27 
These points indicate that while this type of exercise 
 
25 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, An Assessment of the Long-term  
Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements, (Basel: Bank for 
International Settlements, August 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf. In 
December 2010, a Macroeconomic Assessment Group established by the FSB and the 
BCBS released a report on the transitional costs (but not benefits) of the reforms. See: 
Macroeconomic Assessment Group, Final Report Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact 
of the Transition to Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements, (Basel: Bank for 
International Settlements, December 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/othp12.pdf. A 
quantitative impact study was also released on the Basel III proposals. See: Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, Results of the Comprehensive Quantitative Impact 
Study, (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, December 2010), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs186.pdf. Again, this simply estimated the compliance   
impact of the proposals on implementing banks. 
26 
See: Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives, Macroeconomic Impact 
Assessment of OTC Derivatives Regulatory Reforms, (Basel: Bank for International 
Settlements, August 2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/othp20.pdf. 
27 
For example, in its largely contemporaneous progress report on the OTC derivative 
market reforms, the FSB noted that “…over half of FSB member jurisdictions have 
legislative frameworks in place to enable all reform commitments to be implemented.” 
See: Financial Stability Board, OTC Derivatives Market Reforms Sixth Progress Report 
on Implementation, (Basel: Financial Stability Board, 2 September 2013), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130902b.pdf. Further, the major 
outstanding international standard at the time, the impact assessment was released as 
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should be encouraged at the FSB and SSB level in the future, it is not a 
perfect template for rigorous regulatory impact assessment processes. 
Instead, reference is better made to the OECD recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…international standards 
do not take effect without 
national implementation. 
DOMESTIC ASSESSMENTS AND EXTRA- 
TERRITORIAL IMPACTS 
 
With limited exceptions, international standards do not take effect without 
national implementation. At the national level, standards will typically 
flow through the filter of some form of regulatory impact assessment 
before being applied via domestic regulation to the regulated population. 
Currently, national processes for assessing the impact of domestic 
regulation typically incorporate international issues by including the 
following questions: what is the impact of a regulatory proposal on 
international trade;
28 
and do existing international standards apply in the 
area of proposed regulatory action.
29
 
 
The guides do not appear to explicitly ask assessors to consider the 
costs and benefits of proposed domestic regulation in light of potentially 
duplicative, conflicting, or inconsistent requirements applying to entities. 
This is due to the interplay between the proposed domestic and existing 
non-domestic regulation. In stating this, however, it is noted that the 
United  States  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission,  at  least,  has 
conducted this type of consideration in recent years.
30
 
 
 
the margin requirements for uncleared OTC derivative transactions, discussed above. 
These were publicly released in the month following the release of the assessment. 
28 
See, for example: Council of Australian Governments, Best Practice Regulation – A 
Guide for Ministerial Council and National Standard Setting Bodies, (Canberra, October 
2007). It states that “regulatory measures or standards should be compatible with 
relevant international or internationally accepted standards or practices in order to 
minimise the impediments to trade.” A similar point has been made more recently: “[i]f 
any of the options involve establishing or amending standards in areas where 
international standards already apply, you should document whether (and why) the 
standards being proposed differ from the international standard.” See: Commonwealth  
of Australia, The Australian Government Guide to Regulation, (Canberra, March 2014), 
https://www.cuttingredtape.gov.au/handbook/australian-government-guide-regulation. 
See also European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, (Brussels, 15 January 
2009). It is indicated that impact assessments should consider international trade 
impacts. Canadian regulation states that “[r]egulators also need to consider the 
international impacts of their regulations” and highlights that policies can restrict 
international competition. See: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Canadian Cost- 
Benefit Analysis Guide Regulatory Proposals, (Ottawa, 2007). 
29 
The European Commission indicates that impact assessments “should examine 
whether the policy options concern an area in which international standards exist.” See: 
European Commission, “Impact Assessment Guidelines.” 
30 
See the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) discussion of 
the cross-border application of their rules on security-based swap dealers. See: 
Securities and Exchange Commission, “Application of ‘Security-Based Swap Dealer’ 
and ‘Major Security-Based Swap Participant’ Definitions to Cross-Border Security- 
Based Swap Activities,” (Washington DC, 8 September 2014). See in particular the 
discussion commencing on pages 164 and 282. The SEC recognises that the 
application of their Title VII parts of the Dodd-Frank Act to non-US entities could lead to 
market fragmentation and that, in turn, the availability of substituted compliance could 
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While asking about the extra-territorial impacts of domestic regulation 
would not preclude domestic regulation applying to entities that are 
subject to non-domestic regulation already, it would require national 
authorities to consider this type of effect with a view to reducing the costs 
of any interplay between the domestic and non-domestic regulation. 
 
 
HOW COULD REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 
BETTER IMPROVE G20 OUTCOMES? 
 
The points above highlight an opportunity for G20 members to potentially 
improve the outcomes of their regulatory reforms by incorporating ex 
ante regulatory impact assessments that are consistent with the OECD 
recommendations. As indicated, there are two  ways that such 
assessments could be incorporated into the reform process to improve 
regulatory outcomes. 
 
 
AT THE FSB AND SSB LEVEL 
 
First, the G20 could require all FSB and SSB standards and guidance 
presented for its endorsement to have been subject to a regulatory 
impact assessment process that is consistent with the OECD 
recommendations.
31 
These recommendations would need to be adapted 
for international policy processes but, at a minimum, the G20 should 
require the FSB and SSBs to perform a regulatory impact assessment 
that would involve: defining the policy problem that any proposed 
standards seek to solve; identifying a range of policy options to solve this 
problem (including the option of doing nothing); attempting to 
quantitatively assess the potential costs and benefits of those options; 
qualitatively setting out any costs and benefits that cannot feasibly be 
quantified; and publishing these workings contemporaneously with any 
consultation on the proposed standards and inviting comment on them. 
Any standards presented to the G20 would ideally be the policy option 
that is expected to deliver the greatest net societal benefit. If followed, 
this process could be expected to improve the quality of FSB and SSB 
standards. 
 
 
 
 
 
…improve the outcomes 
of their regulatory 
reforms by incorporating 
ex ante regulatory impact 
assessments that are 
consistent with the 
OECD 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reduce costs. The discussion, however, is conducted at a very high level and while it 
quantifies some compliance costs, the analysis does not seek to conclude whether the 
benefits to society from the application of the Title VII to foreign entities would outweigh 
those compliance costs or, more importantly, the costs of market fragmentation. Indeed, 
at footnote 448, the SEC concludes that it is not possible to quantify the economic 
benefit of the reduce probability of a financial crisis. Instead, the SEC analysis is 
predicated upon an assumed unquantified benefit that the application of Title VII to 
foreign entities would bring. 
31 
This requirement should extend to any assessment methodologies developed to aid 
the implementation assessment of the standards where the methodologies add to or 
alter the obligations imposed by the original standard. 
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Asserting this does not intend to gloss over the difficulties of assessing 
the quantitative costs and benefits of proposed financial regulation.
32 
Such assessments face hurdles in accurately predicting the benefit of 
proposed standards (typically couched in terms of avoided financial 
system crises or improved market functioning) and their costs (including 
compliance costs and any impact on the intermediation of money and 
risk). 
 
The assessments would also need to address the issue of how the 
standards would ultimately be implemented domestically. Where 
standards are detailed and will likely be implemented as written, then 
assessment would be more straightforward. Some standards, however, 
are high level and leave members substantial implementation discretion. 
Such standards would be more difficult to assess quantitatively, at least 
without significant assumptions. However, following the steps above for 
all proposed standards could be expected to improve the FSB and 
SSBs’ processes in a number of ways. This includes requiring clear 
expression of the policy problem, requiring consideration of a range of 
policy solutions, rather than those that seem most obvious, building a 
stronger evidence base that is based on quantification where possible to 
aid expert judgement, and exposing the result of this process to public 
scrutiny to both refine it and enhance the accountability of the G20, FSB, 
and SSBs. 
 
 
Being able to follow this 
process effectively would 
require the G20 to give 
the FSB and the SSBs 
discretion in how to solve 
policy problems. 
 
Being able to follow this process effectively would require the G20 to 
give the FSB and the SSBs discretion in how to solve policy problems. 
The G20 would need to ensure that when it sets out its expectations for 
work it focuses on the concerns it may have with an area rather than the 
manner in which those concerns should be addressed. Pre-empting 
policy outcomes in communiqués would  undermine the  process by 
making it politically difficult to consider a range of policy options and 
selecting one on its merits. 
 
 
DOMESTIC CONSIDERATION OF EXTRA-TERRITORIAL COSTS 
 
Second, each G20 member should commit to using domestic ex ante 
regulatory impact assessments to consider the costs and benefits arising 
from the interplay between its domestic financial regulation and any 
 
32 
For a discussion on the feasibility and utility of applying quantitative cost-benefit 
analysis to financial regulation, compare a series of papers by John Coates and Eric 
Posner and Glen Weyl. See: John C. Coates IV, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial 
Regulation: Case Studies and Implications,” ECGI Working Paper Series in Law 234, 
(January 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2375396; Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, 
“Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation,” Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & 
Economics Research Paper 660 (March 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2346466; Eric 
Posner & E. Glen Weyl, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to 
Criticisms,” Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 678, (May 
2014), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/678. Coates highlights 
the difficulties with performing cost-benefit analysis (particularly when done 
quantitatively) on financial regulation. Posner and Weyl present the case that such 
regulation would be amenable to this analysis. 
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applicable non-domestic regulation. This would be consistent with the 
OECD’s recommendation twelve, outlined above. For example, agencies 
should ask whether any domestic or foreign entities would be subject to 
similar rules in foreign jurisdictions to the ones under consideration 
domestically. If so, then agencies should consider how the costs 
associated with this may be reduced or justified by any associated 
benefits. This would help domestic agencies understand the cross- 
border impact of their proposals. Applied consistently, this approach 
could assist in reducing any adverse extra-territorial effects of domestic 
regulation and thereby help avoid the fragmentation of global markets. 
The G20 should mandate the FSB’s Standing Committee on Standards 
Implementation to follow up with national authorities on whether their 
domestic regulatory impact assessment processes provide for and result 
in this type of consideration when implementing FSB and SSB 
standards. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While the quality of the FSB and SSB standards prepared and 
implemented under the G20’s direction has been generally high, there 
remain opportunities for improvement with respect to any further 
standards. Adopting systematic regulatory impact assessments as set 
out in this paper would provide better evidence for and more 
transparency around the policy-making process. Having the best 
evidence available is critical if the G20 is to be confident that 
international standards are well-adapted to meet the challenges it 
identifies. Further, regulatory impact assessments could play an 
important  role  in  ensuring  that  the  implementation  of  the  agreed 
standards does not lead to any undue fragmentation of global markets. 
 
 
 
Having the best evidence 
available is critical... 
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THE TRADE AGENDA AT THE 
BRISBANE SUMMIT: A 
CRUCIAL MOMENT 
 
 
 
 
Otherwise, the G20 may 
itself face a new and not- 
so-comfortable period of 
distrust and 
disengagement. 
IVAN OLIVEIRA
1
 
 
In a gloomy scenario for the world economy and its governance 
structures, circumscribed by an increasingly complex geopolitical 
framework, G20 leaders meeting in Brisbane in November will have a 
much harder task than they thought they would some months ago. In 
essence, the group will have to address some of the ‘new’ challenges 
the world now faces, most of them involving the G20’s own members, in 
a pragmatic and firm manner and without losing a long-term perspective 
on the cooperation process that lies at the heart of the group. Otherwise, 
the G20 may itself face a new and not-so-comfortable period of distrust 
and disengagement. 
 
All engines must therefore be kept at full power in the preparation for the 
Brisbane Summit, which should consolidate the trade and growth 
agendas. These two topics should be the focus for cooperation among 
G20 members over the next months. If they want to consolidate a new 
framework for economic growth with greater growth rates and a better 
quality of life for their citizens, the trade agenda should play a central role 
as a means to achieve this objective. 
 
Global trade governance faces a tough juncture, which may have a 
direct effect on the way trade is negotiated in the multilateral arena. The 
recent stalemate in implementing the Bali Package at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the lowering of expectations about the 
possibility of a feasible new roadmap to conclude the Doha Round 
reinforce that view —notwithstanding the well-appreciated work of the 
WTO Director-General (DG) Roberto Azevedo. If the G20 truly is a 
global economic steering committee, it cannot exit the Brisbane Summit 
without an action plan to boost WTO negotiations and discuss the future 
of world trade regulation under the WTO’s auspices. It is worth noting 
the continued support by the G20, as expressed in its declarations, to 
having a stronger and rules-based multilateral trading system as the 
centre for global trade governance. Therefore, restoring faith in the 
global trading system and in the future of the WTO must be a pivotal 
result of the next G20 summit, for the sake of the WTO and the G20 
itself. 
 
In order to do so, a definitive commitment on the implementation of the 
Bali Package by each of the G20 members should be publicised in 
 
 
1 
Economist and Coordinator of International Economic Studies, Institute of Applied 
Economic Research (IPEA). 
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Brisbane (if not before). There needs to be final agreement and a 
guarantee of support from the sceptics within the group, to settle the 
disputes once and for all. The issue is too important for the world trade 
system not to receive special attention from G20 leaders, followed by the 
necessary actions. The Brisbane Summit should be the deadline for this. 
In addition, G20 leaders should clearly define, in dialogue and 
coordination with WTO DG Roberto Azevedo, the way ahead for the 
Doha Round — be it an end to the negotiations or a new and 
transparent agenda to conclude it in the near future. 
 
If the Doha Round cannot be completed at all, G20 members ought to 
have a common approach to the role that the WTO will play in the global 
trading system in the future. This role should be focused on being the 
arena for negotiation of plurilateral agreements. The WTO’s well- 
consolidated dispute settlement mechanism and the inclusion of ‘most 
favoured nation’ (MFN) clauses can be used in order to multilateralise 
the results of those agreements, in other words, to help non-participants 
in such plurilateral agreements to benefit as well. 
 
It is also in the plurilateral agreements scheme that the agendas of the 
private and  public sectors (intertwined  in  the  global-regional  values 
chains approach) can be seen. The way trade can be facilitated and 
liberalised in order to integrate countries into different stages of some of 
those value chains, including the services sector, should be stressed as 
an integral part of the WTO in the future by G20 members in Brisbane. 
 
Furthermore, the WTO’s role in reinforcing the commitment to roll back 
protectionist measures, particularly non-tariff ones, introduced since the 
global financial crisis by G20 countries, must also be emphasised. The 
group should demand the WTO secretariat to continuously monitor trade 
policies regarding this goal. The secretariat should produce twice-a-year 
reports that are brought to the public before the G20 summits and/or 
trade ministers’ meetings during the year. By doing so, both the G20 and 
the WTO would be working together in order to consolidate freer and 
more stable trade flows. This would significantly contribute to the greater 
goal of increasing economic growth worldwide by 2 per cent in the next 
five years. 
 
In order to strengthen G20 members’ commitment to restoring faith in a 
stronger multilateral trading system, the group should act to bring greater 
transparency to regional trade agreements by reporting on the relevant 
commitments   agreed  last  year   during  the  Russian  presidency.
2
 
Additionally, new steps for monitoring and reviewing regional trade 
agreements in the WTO should be supported by G20 members based 
 
 
…G20 members ought to 
have a common 
approach to the role that 
the WTO will play in the 
global trading system in 
the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
G20, “G20 Leaders' Declaration, St Petersburg,” (Saint Petersburg, 6 September 
2013), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html. 
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on the model of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism in place since the 
1990s.
3
 
 
 
If trade openness is 
indeed vitally important 
for cooperation among 
G20 economies, the 
Brisbane Summit must 
be seen as a crucial 
moment. 
Market openness to trade is a significant driver for stronger, sustained, 
and balanced economic growth worldwide. The WTO is the core 
organisation for helping to keep markets open and thus creating jobs 
and opportunities and fostering productivity among its members. If trade 
openness is indeed vitally important for cooperation among G20 
economies, the Brisbane Summit must be seen as a crucial moment 
when the fate of two different institutions meet and the success of one 
may determine the success of the other. The more the G20 can do to 
resolve some of the challenging issues regarding multilateral 
negotiations and to help rethink the WTO as the guardian of a stable and 
prosperous world trade order, the stronger the group will be. Therefore, 
bringing trade to centre stage at the Brisbane Summit in November will 
strengthen the group’s credibility as a premier  forum for economic 
cooperation, especially in the adverse circumstances the world faces 
today 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
WTO, “Annex 3 - Trade Policy Review Mechanism,” in Uruguay Round Agreements 
(Marrakesh: WTO, 1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/29-tprm.pdf. 
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G20 CONFERENCE SUMMARY: 
STRENGTHENING 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 
 
DANIELA STRUBE
1
 
 
This paper summarises the key ideas discussed at the G20 conference, 
Strengthening Accountability and Effectiveness, held on 25 June 2014 in 
Melbourne. The conference was organised by the G20 Studies Centre at 
the Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
 
Strengthening accountability is vital for reinforcing the G20’s position as 
the premier forum for international economic cooperation. The objective 
of the conference was to canvass specific proposals on how to enhance 
the G20’s accountability and effectiveness. A particular focus was to 
ascertain how key G20 stakeholders, in particular international 
organisations and business and labour groups, as well as civil society 
and think tanks, could complement member countries in making the G20 
more efficient, more accountable, and more responsive to the global 
challenges of the twenty-first century. 
 
 
A FOCUSED AND INTEGRATED AGENDA 
 
There was much discussion by all stakeholders on the importance of the 
G20 having a focused and integrated agenda. On this point, two issues 
were highlighted for further improvements. First, while recognising the 
ongoing efforts by the Australian G20 presidency, many work streams 
are still being pursued and there is still a need to further prioritise the 
agenda for the leaders’ meeting in November. On the positive side, the 
fact that the Australian presidency has not expanded the G20 agenda in 
2014 was welcomed and Prime Minister Abbott’s commitment to a three- 
page communiqué for the leaders’ summit was seen as a positive 
development. In addition, it was suggested that the commitment by G20 
finance ministers to increase global growth by an extra 2 per cent over 
five years may serve as a galvanising mechanism for all G20 
stakeholders to focus on the central task of delivering growth. 
 
Second, further improvements in integrating policy development and 
implementation across G20 working groups were considered necessary. 
G20 stakeholders, including the international organisations, described 
their difficulties in effectively coordinating their inputs into the different 
working groups. This is particularly important, as a key feature of the 
G20 growth strategies that countries are developing in preparation for 
 
 
Strengthening 
accountability is vital for 
reinforcing the G20’s 
position as the premier 
forum for international 
economic cooperation. 
 
 
1 
Research Fellow, G20 Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
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the Brisbane Summit is their comprehensiveness. As such, the policy 
areas in the growth strategies should span several working groups. 
While the Australian presidency is working towards introducing a more 
integrated agenda, many stakeholders identified the importance of 
further progress in integrating the activities of the various working 
groups. 
 
 
…it is important that 
introducing a greater 
focus and integration in 
the G20 agenda is not 
mistaken for 
universalism, or a ‘one- 
size-fits-all’ approach… 
 
A more focused and integrated agenda will help clarify the policy 
objectives of G20 members and, in turn, the ability to assess whether 
they are implementing their commitments. This goes to the heart of 
strengthening the effectiveness of the G20. However, it is important that 
introducing a greater focus and integration in the G20 agenda is not 
mistaken for universalism, or a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to analysing 
and solving policy problems. Countries’ priorities differ, as do their 
domestic economic and political situations. As one conference 
participant pointedly summarised, the G20 should provide a policy 
framework, not a policy prescription. 
 
 
LEADERSHIP AND TRANSPARENCY 
 
Political leadership was identified as a key prerequisite for the 
effectiveness of the G20. This was highlighted in John Lipsky’s keynote 
address at the conference when he observed that one of the main 
reasons for the G20’s lack of effectiveness, particularly in terms of 
economic policy cooperation, was the very limited public commitment to 
the process at the political level. As Lipsky pointed out, key G20 leaders 
have typically not conveyed to their own citizens that global policy 
cooperation is critical to improving their own economies’ performance. 
The level of commitment by G20 leaders is the most important predictor 
for the success of a G20 summit. 
 
There was a broad consensus among conference participants on the 
importance of engaging domestic constituencies in the G20 process, 
recognising that such support was necessary for the implementation of 
commitments made at G20 meetings. The G20 ‘engagement partners’, 
— business, labour, civil society, think tanks and youth — highlighted the 
role they played in involving segments of the public in the G20 process. 
It was also noted that in order to engage the public, it is necessary to 
translate G20 policy measures and processes so that citizens can see 
their relevance to their own circumstances. The G20 has to move away 
from the perception that it is closed conversation between elites. This is 
particularly important since, as noted by a number of participants, trust in 
politics has been eroded since the crisis, and a complex and abstract 
construct such as the G20 may seem particularly suspicious. 
 
 
COLLABORATION 
 
Collaboration across national and institutional boundaries goes to the 
heart  of  the  G20  and  is  an  imperative  in  the  twenty-first  century. 
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Nevertheless, some conference participants warned that a perception 
remains that some countries may still be able to shape the world 
(economy) on their own. On the contrary, coordinated action is 
considered vital in areas such as trade and infrastructure for attaining the 
extra 2 per cent growth objective. 
 
It was noted however, that collaboration is complex and has to be 
comprehensive in order to be successful. If disagreements persist 
regarding the assessment of policy problems, it is impossible to align 
policy solutions and outcomes. Some officials taking part in the 
conference saw progress in the G20’s culture of cooperation. It was 
suggested that a sense of cooperative behaviour has largely crowded 
out a more defensive stance and created a new narrative that is based 
on a shared view about the G20’s accountability agenda. This is seen by 
some officials as a key factor that has contributed to strengthening the 
G20 over the last few months. 
 
Progress was also identified regarding the collaboration between the 
G20 and international organisations. This reflects a more collaborative 
approach based on mutual trust and respect. In moving forward, it was 
however maintained that the partnership could be even more effective if 
the G20 asked for policy recommendations more explicitly, as this can 
increase the relevance of international organisations’ input. Optimism 
was also expressed regarding the prospects for effectively managing 
institutional competition among international organisations in engaging 
with the G20. It was suggested that international organisations may, in 
fact, be most effective when working across institutional boundaries. 
Since policy issues are often multidimensional, there is strong potential 
for benefiting from complementarities in the particular expertise of 
international organisations in order to best address different aspects of a 
policy area. 
 
While recognising the potential benefits of further expanding international 
and institutional collaboration, the importance of prioritising efforts and 
ensuring that activities are as efficient as possible was emphasised. In 
particular, it was considered important to determine ex ante where 
collective action is required and worth the effort. Political resources, 
especially at very senior levels, are scarce and should therefore be 
directed at issues where they are most effective. 
 
 
NURTURING IDEAS 
 
Suggestions for strengthening the input of new ideas into the G20 policy 
process received particular support at the conference. Think tanks 
(Think20 or T20 in the official G20 engagement architecture) were 
identified as obvious candidates for contributing to a process of nurturing 
ideas, providing independent analysis and policy recommendations. This 
was  seen  as  particularly  important  for  ideas  at  an  early  stage  of 
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boundaries goes to the 
heart of the G20 and is 
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twenty-first century. 
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development and when they needed to be shaped and debated before 
being picked up by the political process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suggestions for 
strengthening the input of 
new ideas into the G20 
policy process received 
particular support... . 
 
It was also pointed out during the conference that the ‘socialisation’ of 
ideas can be fostered by international organisations. While this may not 
lead to immediate outcomes, it may provide important, shared, and 
lasting benefits that will ultimately be reflected in policy outcomes. On a 
similar point, it was also highlighted that international organisations can 
benefit from the G20 in this process — by building political support for 
their ideas, findings, and policy priorities. In terms of a specific proposal, 
it was suggested that the G20 should use think tanks as a ‘second 
opinion’ for policy and background papers it receives from international 
organisations. 
 
 
NEGLECTED AREAS 
 
Despite participants agreeing on the importance of a focused agenda, a 
few topics were repeatedly mentioned as areas that should receive a 
larger profile in the G20. These included: climate change and 
environmental constraints to growth, ageing and its implications for 
public finances, and inclusive growth. The latter was identified by many 
participants as a significant shortcoming in the current G20 agenda. It 
was also noted that any commitment to inclusive growth needed to be 
more than just rhetorical. 
 
It was also advocated that the additional 2 per cent growth objective 
needed to be consistent with the post-2015 development framework, 
because these two policy initiatives are potentially the largest and most 
comprehensive schemes that will have an impact on the future of the 
global economy (including its social dimensions). It was also noted that 
the majority of poor people live in G20 countries.
2  
More generally, a 
number of conference participants argued that the G20 has to commit 
more credibly to ‘working for the people’. They considered that a people- 
centric approach needed to be better reflected in both the G20 agenda 
and process. 
 
 
ASIAN PARTICIPATION 
 
Conference participants noted the relatively low level of Asian 
participation in G20 engagement groups such as the Business20 (B20) 
and the Labour20 (L20). This contrasts with the economic and political 
significance of Asia. The wider Asia-Pacific region is indeed the largest 
country group in the G20. Questions were asked whether the relative 
underrepresentation of Asia in G20 engagement is due to G20-specific 
agenda and procedural reasons or whether more general structural 
 
 
2 
Oxfam, Left Behind by the G20? How Inequality and Environmental Degradation 
Threaten to Exclude Poor People from the Benefits of Economic Growth, Oxfam 
Briefing Paper 157, (19 January 2012). 
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factors are at play. Both the B20 and L20 participants in the conference 
committed to continue their efforts to strengthen Asian participation in 
their own forums. 
 
The T20 is also very committed to ensuring that Asia is well represented 
in its activities. Increasing Asian engagement remains equally relevant in 
the wider think tank and academic world — the fact that only one Asian 
economist has ever received a Nobel Prize is a case in point.
3
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A continuing, thorough, and open debate about the G20’s accountability 
and effectiveness is of utmost importance. This observation was 
frequently reiterated by conference participants. 
 
While conference participants noted some progress in the recent efforts 
to strengthen the G20’s accountability and effectiveness, there was a 
clear sense that more improvements are required. One conference 
participant used a doctor-patient analogy to describe this assessment: if 
the G20 is the doctor and the global economy is the patient, the doctor 
has certainly succeeded in keeping the patient alive and improving, but 
the patient is not yet free of ailments and the doctor has to keep thinking 
about how to support the patient’s recovery. 
 
Participants also agreed with the premise that there is currently no 
alternative to the G20. It was repeatedly stated that if the G20 did not 
exist, it (or a mechanism very similar to it) would have to be invented. 
This pivotal role of the G20 should give everyone involved a strong 
incentive to work towards its success. 
This pivotal role of the 
G20 should give 
everyone involved a 
strong incentive to work 
towards its success. 
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Yoon Je Cho, “Global Economic Governance Reform and the Role of Asia: 
Opportunities Offered by the G20,” Journal of East Asian Economic Integration 16 
(March 2012). 
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ANTI-CORRUPTION, 
INTEGRITY OR JUST PLAIN 
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND 
SMART REGULATION? WHY 
ANTI-CORRUPTION REMAINS 
A VITAL ELEMENT OF THE G20 
LEADERS’ AGENDA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…if corruption were an 
industry, it would be the 
world’s third largest. 
AJ BROWN
1
 
 
Corruption costs the world economy and everyone it touches. A decade 
ago, a World Bank estimate put the global cost of corruption at $1 trillion 
per annum.
2 
More recently, the OECD suggested that if corruption were 
an industry, it would be the world’s third largest, now worth more than $3 
trillion and 5 per cent of global GDP.
3 
Indeed, ‘corruption kills’, as Elena 
Panfilova, head of Transparency International Russia, told a key 
international conference on anti-corruption and the G20 in Brisbane in 
June in the lead up to the November 2014 G20 leaders’ summit.
4
 
 
But are these simple facts enough to justify the inclusion of corruption as 
a focus for debate by G20 leaders — especially when the focus is on 
trying to get the G20 back on track with a manageable agenda aimed at 
its core missions of cooperation for economic growth and resilience? 
While a continuation of the G20’s anti-corruption efforts in 2015-2016 is 
now more or less guaranteed, questions remain about what a next Anti- 
Corruption Action Plan should contain, how it should be focused, and 
most importantly, why such a plan is sufficiently central to G20 leaders’ 
core business to warrant a place on the agenda. 
 
This paper suggests answers by reviewing key recommendations on 
integrity and anti-corruption for the 2014 G20 summit arising from the 
G20 engagement groups — civil society (C20), business (B20), labour 
(L20), young people (Y20), and think tanks (T20). From these, we can 
see a more focused agenda emerging. But it also provokes the further 
question of whether this will or should lead to just an anti-corruption plan 
 
1 
Professor of Public Policy and Law and Program Leader Public Integrity and Anti- 
Corruption, in the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University. 
2 
World Bank, “Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global 
Governance Director Daniel Kaufmann,” (Washington DC: World Bank, April 2004), 
http://go.worldbank.org/KQH743GKF1. 
3 
OECD, “Implementing the OECD Principles for Integrity in Public Procurement,” (Paris: 
OECD, 21 November 2013). 
4 
The comments were made at the conference “Corruption, Integrity Systems and the 
G20,” held by Griffith University and Transparency International, 17 and 18 June 2014 
in Brisbane. 
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or a more integrated governance reform agenda to support a more 
streamlined G20 agenda overall. Irrespective of the final strategy, the 
ongoing relevance of strategic corruption and integrity objectives, and 
monitoring, is beyond doubt in the G20 context. 
 
 
ANTI-CORRUPTION IN THE G20: A SUCCESSFUL 
DISTRACTION? 
 
The period of Australia’s presidency of the G20 has been widely seen as 
something of a watershed, dominated by both need and opportunity to 
reconfirm the relevance of the G20 as a unique forum for economic and 
financial cooperation — as opposed to just another large symbolic 
meeting of world leaders. The relative success of the G20’s response to 
the first wave of the global financial crisis, combined with its elevation to 
a leaders’ rather  than only finance ministers’ process, brought it a 
reputation as the pre-eminent forum for international cooperation in 
general — not simply for financial coordination.
5  
As Stephen Grenville 
described on the eve of Australia joining the G20 leadership ‘troika’, this 
reputation exacerbated the inevitable problem of ‘mission creep’ with a 
host of new initiatives — he nominated poverty, food security, and 
climate change — providing an increasing ‘distraction’ from the core, 
unfinished business flowing from the peak agreements of 2008 and 
2009.
6
 
 
Whether such issues should be seen as peripheral to economic and 
financial coordination is of course debatable. But few would claim that 
they have no place in helping define the type of global economic growth 
that G20 coordination is intended to underpin. The main issue is that 
whatever the goals, much remains to be delivered on the original 
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth (FSSBG) 
agreed at the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit. This includes agenda items that 
“in broad terms remain both relevant and unfinished,” as opposed to 
further “worthy issues” which have been seen to “dilute the focus of the 
summits … [but haven’t] lead to clear conclusions or actionable results.”
7
 
Reinforcing this call for a return to the Framework as “the core and 
backbone” of the G20 agenda,
8 
Mike Callaghan provided his own list of 
the types of issues that had ‘sidetracked’ the G20 since 2009 — 
distracting  it  from  “important  developments  in  the  global  economy: 
 
Whether such issues 
should be seen as 
peripheral to economic 
and financial 
coordination is of course 
debatable. 
 
 
5 
Stephen Grenville, “An Agenda for the 2014 G20 in Brisbane,” The Interpreter (blog), 
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/08/06/An-agenda-for-the-2014-G20-in- 
Brisbane.aspx. 
6 
Ibid. 
7 
John Lipsky, “The Brisbane Summit: A Critical Moment for the G20 Leaders’ Process,” 
in G20 2014: The G20 Brisbane Summit, Inequality, Energy and Anti-Corruption, G20 
Monitor No. 12, (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2014). 
8 
Mike Callaghan, Strengthening the Core of the G20: Clearer Objectives, Better 
Communication, Greater Transparency and Accountability, Lowy Institute Analysis, 
(Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013). 
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financial inclusion, financial literacy, fossil fuel subsidies, anti-corruption, 
and protection of the marine environment.”
9
 
 
The fundamental question raised by efforts to restore and refocus the 
G20 in 2014 is whether the G20’s anti-corruption efforts belong on this 
list, irrespective of the place of the other items. Hugh Jorgensen has 
provided a detailed account of the work carried out by G20 governments 
under the successive G20 anti-corruption action plans since 2010.
10 
In 
contrast to descriptions of the G20’s ‘new’ interests as lacking clear 
conclusions or actionable results, Jorgensen’s analysis points to its anti- 
corruption work as being, in many instances, relatively concrete and 
successful by G20 standards. Nevertheless, the question remains as to 
whether, or where, this really fits as an element of the G20 agenda: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even if successful, is a 
G20 anti-corruption 
agenda simply, at best, a 
‘value-add’ to other 
international efforts? Or 
merely ‘complementary’, 
rather than integral to 
G20 core business? 
 
If G20 leaders have a clear sense of ownership over their stated 
objectives for and outcomes on anti-corruption, as well as a plan for how 
the G20 can provide a unique ‘value-add’ to anti-corruption efforts that 
other multilateral institutions cannot, then the case for renewing the 
G20’s anti-corruption commitments is strong. On the other hand, if 
leaders believe the ACWG’s (Anti-Corruption Working Group) work does 
not meet these requirements, or that its work on anti-corruption is not 
sufficiently complementary to the G20’s core focus on reinvigorating 
economic growth, then renewing the group’s mandate without proper 
critical appraisal would compound perceptions about the G20’s ‘bloated’ 
agenda.
11
 
 
Even if successful, is a G20 anti-corruption agenda simply, at best, a 
‘value-add’ to other international efforts? Or merely ‘complementary’, 
rather than integral to G20 core business? The question is furthered by a 
decision of the G20 sherpas at their first meeting under the Australian 
presidency in December 2013. They asked the G20 Anti-Corruption 
Working Group (ACWG) to recommend the content for a continuing G20 
Anti-Corruption Action Plan (ACAP) beyond the current 2013-2014 Plan 
adopted in Los Cabos in 2012.
12  
This request is consistent with the 
decision of leaders at the 2013 St Petersburg Summit to upgrade the 
status of the ACWG, first created at the June 2010 Toronto Summit, to 
an ongoing G20 working group. It is also consistent with Australia’s 
support for anti-corruption as one of the ten work streams of G20 activity. 
Indeed, a number of key international anti-corruption measures were 
 
 
9 
Mike Callaghan, Relaunching the G20, Lowy Institute Analysis, (Sydney: Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 2013). 
10 
Hugh Jorgensen, “Hard Graft: The G20 and Anti-Corruption,” in Tax, Infrastructure, 
Anti-Corruption, Energy and the G20, G20 Monitor No. 6 (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2013). 
11 
Ibid. 
12 
For the current 2013-2014 ACAP, see: G20, “G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2013- 
2014,” (Los Cabos, 2012), 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/g20-anti-corruption-action- plan-2013-
14.pdf. 
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included in the original 2009 Framework agenda, suggesting this work 
stream has always been important to the core G20 agenda. 
13
 
 
The problems, as noted by Jorgensen, are twofold. First, the actual 
rationale for the relevance of anti-corruption only emerged subsequent to 
its expansion as an agenda item in 2010, adding to the impression of yet 
another item borne more of leaders’ inability, politically, to resist it than of 
policy centrality to the G20’s financial coordination objectives. Under this 
ex post facto rationale, corruption is relevant because it constitutes a 
direct drain on growth, as noted at the outset — diverting resources (for 
example through theft of public monies), driving up costs, uncertainties, 
inefficiencies and barriers to entry (for example through bribery), and 
distorting public policy and markets away from ‘rational’ public interest 
principles.
14
 
 
Second, rather than constituting a G20 program in its own right, the work 
stream has tended to mirror a wider ‘smorgasbord’ of international anti- 
corruption priorities, such as mechanisms under the UN Convention 
Against Corruption, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and the anti- 
money laundering rules of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
While on the one hand the G20 ACWG can thus claim success in 
helping prosecute a range of these priorities in new and different ways, 
there remains an impression that the work stream is “mostly incremental, 
frequently piece-meal, and sometimes haphazard.”
15
 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: T20, C20, B20, L20, Y20 
 
What light do the policy discussions of 2014 throw on these twin 
problems? And what are the submissions and recommendations of the 
engagement groups (T20, C20, B20, L20 and Y20)? First, so far in 2014 
there has been little argument from G20 stakeholders that to be effective 
and get results the anti-corruption work stream would benefit from a 
more focused agenda with a reduced number of strategic priorities. 
 
…the work stream has 
tended to mirror a wider 
‘smorgasbord’ of 
international anti- 
corruption priorities. 
 
 
13 
These measures were: (1) working with the World Bank’s Stolen Assets Recovery 
(StAR) program to secure the return of stolen assets to developing countries, (2) asking 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to help detect and deter the proceeds of 
corruption by prioritising work to strengthen standards on customer due diligence, 
beneficial ownership and transparency, (3) working to increase the transparency of 
international aid flows by 2010, and (4) adopting and enforcing laws against 
transnational bribery, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the UNCAC. See 
also Jorgensen, “Hard graft.” 
14 
This primary rationale was articulated in the first two-year G20 Anti-Corruption Action 
Plan, adopted by leaders at the November 2010 Seoul Summit: “Corruption is a severe 
impediment to economic growth.” See: G20, “G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2010 - 
G20 Agenda for Action on Combatting Corruption, Promoting Market Integrity, and 
Supporting a Clean Business Environment,” (Seoul, 2010), 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Annex%203%20Anti- 
Corruption_Action_Plan_2010.pdf. 
15 
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Table 1 sets out the submissions and recommendations of the T20, C20 
and B20 — drawing on each group’s submissions to the ACWG on the 
proposed content of the post-2014 action plan and integrity and 
corruption related items in their G20 communiqués or policy 
recommendations as a whole. Further mention is also made below of the 
L20 and Y20 communiqués. Not only is the number of recommended 
action areas generally reduced for the G20’s third two-year action plan 
(in contrast to the growing number and increasing vagueness of 
objectives in the first and second two-year plans), but as Table 1 shows, 
there is significant congruence between them. Moreover, key items 
remain aligned with those identified as worthy of action in the 2009 
Framework. This is consistent with the objective of following through on 
difficult, unfinished business. 
 
 
Less clear, however, is 
whether this agenda- 
focusing assists with a 
clearer understanding of 
why such priorities are 
uniquely suited or central 
to G20 core business. 
 
Less clear, however, is whether this agenda-focusing assists with a 
clearer understanding of why such priorities are uniquely suited or 
central to G20 core business. In order to discern this, it is useful to 
analyse three of the proposed 2014-2015 priorities (in decreasing order 
of congruence across the submissions): transparency of corporate 
ownership, foreign bribery and other corruption law enforcement, and 
whistle-blower protection. 
 
 
TRANSPARENCY OF CORPORATE (BENEFICIAL) 
OWNERSHIP 
 
Overcoming the ease with which ‘shell’ companies may be created, 
bought, and sold around the world, as anonymous vehicles for engaging 
in or transferring the proceeds of corruption, has been an issue on the 
G20 agenda since the 2009 Framework. Research has repeatedly 
demonstrated the significance of the problem. Identifying this as the first 
of Australia’s priorities for the ACWG in 2014, Australia’s Attorney- 
General, Senator George Brandis, referred a Sydney meeting of the 
group to the results of a 2011 study by the World Bank-UNODC Stolen 
Assets Recovery Initiative. It showed that 150 of 213 serious corruption 
trials investigated worldwide involved the use of at least one corporate 
vehicle to hide information about the beneficial owners — with the 
estimated proceeds of corruption sought to be concealed amounting to 
$US 56.4 billion.
16
 
 
 
16 
George Brandis, “Address at the Opening of the G20 Anti-Corruption Roundtable,” 
(speech, Sydney, 28 February 2014), 
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Speeches/Pages/2014/First Quarter 
2014/28February2014-AddressattheopeningoftheG20AntiCorruptionRoundtable.aspx. 
Citing: Emile van der Does de Willebois et al., “The Puppet Masters: How the Corrupt 
Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It,” (Washington DC: 
World Bank, 24 October 2011), 
https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/puppetmastersv1.pdf. See also: Michael 
Findley, Daniel Nielson and Jason Sharman, Global Shell Games: Experiments in 
Transnational Relations, Crime, and Terrorism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014). 
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In the current 2013-2014 G20 ACAP, G20 members have already 
welcomed “the adoption of the revised FATF standards, which include 
areas of particular importance to the fight against corruption, such as 
those relating to beneficial ownership information, customer due 
diligence and company formation” and looked forward “to their 
implementation and to the completion in 2013 of the update of the FATF 
assessment procedure with specific focus on effectiveness.”
17
 
 
With the G8 having adopted new principles in June 2013 aimed at 
cracking down on the “misuse of companies and legal arrangements,” 
the development of equivalent principles for collective implementation by 
G20 countries was elevated to the top of the ACWG’s agenda at the 
meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in Sydney 
in February 2014. The resulting G20 principles will be considered by 
finance ministers in September 2014 and in turn by leaders in November 
2014, before being publicly announced. Thereafter, the focus will be on 
cooperation for implementation including a mixture of enhanced 
transparency requirements for the beneficial ownership of companies 
and similar entities, such as through public registers, and a greater focus 
on introducing and enforcing licensing arrangements which require 
corporate service providers to collect the necessary ownership 
information prior to creating or selling corporate vehicles. 
 
However, the consensus around the importance of G20 action over shell 
companies is only partly because of the increased recognition of their 
impact on growth. From both the research and the engagement group 
submissions, the types of ‘corruption’ that will be more easily addressed 
through measures addressing shell companies are not limited to theft 
and bribery. They extend to other problems in the financial system 
including tax evasion and other illicit financial flows — indeed to any 
corporate practices of such irresponsibly high risk that anonymous 
companies become attractive as a means of insulating the real owners 
from any accountability for misdeeds or failures. 
 
Consequently, much of the official discourse and most of the 
submissions focus on this issue as being relevant more broadly to 
stemming corruption, regulatory breaches, and corporate social 
irresponsibility, rather than simply to those offences that fall within the 
purview of corruption as defined by the UNCAC or OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention. For example, the C20’s communiqué points to this issue as 
relevant not only to corruption, but to “tax avoidance, tax evasion, money 
laundering and terrorist financing.” In the same way, its 
recommendations on governance point to the importance of G20 action 
to address base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) in public taxation and 
effective and equitable arrangements for the automatic exchange of tax 
 
…the consensus around 
the importance of G20 
action over shell 
companies is only partly 
because of the increased 
recognition of their 
impact on growth. 
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information  as  fundamental  issues  for  the  G20’s  core  agenda  of 
restoring growth and building economic resilience.
18
 
 
 
…the consensus around 
the importance of G20 
action over shell 
companies is only partly 
because of the increased 
recognition of their 
impact on growth. 
This consensus is also shared by the Y20 and L20 engagement groups. 
In the  case  of the Y20,  its final call for increased transparency in 
corporate ownership is not explicitly linked to corruption at all — in terms 
of ‘hard’ corruption offences — but rather to the wider imperative of 
“tackling anti-competitive behaviours,” all in the name of strengthening 
“states’ capacity to face the financial and fiscal challenges ahead.”
19 
In 
other words, the issue as much concerns the effective regulation and 
resilience of the international financial system as it does the problems of 
growth-erosion prioritised by the G20’s primary anti-corruption rationale. 
 
Similarly, the L20’s main communiqué presents the issue as primarily 
one of needing to ensure the “accountability and transparency of 
financial intermediaries, asset managers and bankers.” This, alongside 
the need to “address regulatory and market barriers to long term 
investment … [and] mainstream responsible business conduct by 
investors,” is seen as having at least as much to do with stepping up the 
momentum on effective taxation and financial regulation in the interests 
of economic resilience as it has with corruption, narrowly defined.
20
 
 
In these respects, while the ACWG has thus been tasked with a 
challenge of great significance for combating corruption as traditionally 
understood, the consensus behind this priority as a G20 objective can be 
seen as stemming from its relevance to combating threats to financial 
integrity and stability more broadly. 
 
 
FOREIGN BRIBERY AND OTHER CORRUPTION LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
A similar lesson emerges from the submissions of the T20, C20, and 
B20 relating to foreign bribery and direct corruption offences where there 
is again a fair degree of congruence — but with some telling and 
unexpected distinctions. Whereas all three sets of submissions suggest 
the G20 has an  ongoing role to play in  leading implementation of 
international agreements such as UNCAC and the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, it is actually the B20 who elevate this issue to one of more 
general significance for the G20 than simply being about bribery. While 
endorsing the importance of combating the direct impacts of ‘hard’ 
corruption on the global economy, the B20 does not present the required 
actions as a stand-alone anti-corruption agenda item, but rather as part 
 
18 
See also: C20, “Australian C20 Summit Communique” (Melbourne, 23 June 2014), 
http://www.c20.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/C20-Final-Communique.pdf. 
19 
Y20, “Y20 Australia 2014 Delegates’ Declaration,” (Sydney, 15 July 2014), 
https://y20australia.com/news-and-media/y20-australia-2014-delegates%E2%80%99- 
declaration. 
20 
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of a more positive growth-enhancing agenda of ensuring “integrity and 
credibility in commerce.” Moreover, while some of the B20’s focus is on 
the economic benefits of harmonising anti-corruption laws, it is also clear 
that this is just one aspect. The G20 has the potential to assist the cause 
of globally consistent and effective business regulation more generally 
— in which corruption, anti-money laundering, and counter-terrorism 
financing rules are seen as an important part of overall “prudential and 
conduct regulation” rather than as unique, extra species.
21
 
 
Indeed, the B20’s elevation of commercial integrity and credibility to one 
of just four overall themes for the G20 in 2014 — alongside structural 
flexibility, free movement of business across borders, and consistent and 
effective regulation — suggests that a corruption focus lies squarely at 
the heart of the G20 agenda. In some respects, this is surprising given 
the decision of the Australian-led B20 to break with recent tradition and 
not constitute its own anti-corruption task force as part of the advisory 
process. It instead established just four task forces on trade, human 
capital, infrastructure and investment, and financing growth, in an 
apparent gesture towards restoring a more focused and manageable 
G20 agenda. As a result, anti-corruption became the focus of a working 
group drawing on the issues identified by all four task forces — its 
apparently downgraded status emphasised by the fact it was the only 
such working group in the B20 process. That integrity issues emerged so 
prominently in its recommendations, despite this ‘focusing’, appears to 
come as direct confirmation that corruption issues — understood in their 
broader context as regulatory and conduct issues — are indeed intrinsic 
to the economic and financial focus of the G20. 
 
A more specific surprise can be seen in the divergence of the 
engagement groups on the G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan commitment 
relating to anti-corruption authorities. Whereas the original 2009 
Framework did not descend into the detail of advocating institutional 
arrangements for prosecuting corruption, both the first and second two- 
year anti-corruption action plans called for specific, albeit vague action 
on this issue.
22 
In reality, little work of substance was done and the issue 
 
 
…corruption, anti-money 
laundering, and counter- 
terrorism financing rules 
are seen as an important 
part of overall “prudential 
and conduct regulation” 
rather than as unique, 
extra species. 
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B20, “Driving Growth and Jobs: B20 Policy Recommendations to the G20,” (Sydney, 
6 August 2014), 
http://www.b20australia.info/Latest%20Documents/Driving%20growth%20and%20jobs 
%20-%20B20%20policy%20recommendations%20to%20G20.pdf. See 
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Among the nine points of the first plan (Seoul 2010) was a commitment to “the 
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“G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2010.” In the current plan (Los Cabos 2012), G20 
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seemed well covered by Articles 6 and 26 of the UNCAC dealing with 
anti-corruption bodies and specialised authorities. 
 
 
…it emphasises that a 
key to the worthiness of 
any action item is not 
only broad relevance, but 
also whether it has 
specific, strategic 
significance. 
 
In recognition of the practical benefits of a more focused agenda, anti- 
corruption authorities do not feature in the C20 or T20 submissions on 
priorities for the post-2014 action plan. They do feature, however, in the 
B20’s recommendation that G20 countries should not only “endorse 
applicable legal frameworks … [but] implement or strengthen a national 
independent corruption authority in each jurisdiction to monitor  and 
enforce.”
23   
The  survival  of  this  item  is  perhaps  explained  by  the 
importance to international business of having a recognisable, credible 
point for the high-level reporting of corruption activity, prioritised by other 
recommendations. In any event, it emphasises that a key to the 
worthiness of any action item is not only broad relevance, but also 
whether it has specific, strategic significance. 
 
In contrast, the C20 communiqué’s treatment of foreign bribery signals a 
different issue with strategic significance of its own: a call for G20 
members to commit not only to “greater consistency and enforcement in 
foreign bribery offences … [but] enhanced cooperation, including for 
equity, when G20 members enter into settlements of foreign bribery 
prosecutions.” The rationale for this call lies in evidence that few of the 
substantial funds recouped by governments (notably the United States 
and United Kingdom) as a result of foreign bribery offences by large 
companies currently flow to the developing countries in which the 
criminal acts occur. The suggested addition of this item points to another 
criterion which can, and does, appear to provide a logical rationale for 
items on the anti-corruption agenda: items that are particularly suited to 
harnessing the diversity of the G20 economies in support of concrete 
action that may otherwise remain either abstract or divisive. The same is 
true of beneficial ownership, discussed above, on which developing and 
developed economies alike can unite in support of enforced standards 
— especially given evidence that, similarly, it is the financial systems of 
developed countries that tend to be those most often used to launder the 
proceeds of corruption from developing ones. 
 
 
WHISTLE-BLOWER PROTECTION 
 
The third, unfinished priority in the ACAP reinforces the case for a 
clearer rationale regarding which items are sufficiently central and 
strategic to G20 core business to remain on a more focused agenda. It 
also assists in suggesting such a rationale. Like the specific focus on 
anti-corruption authorities, “the preparation and implementation of 
corruption whistle-blower protection legislation” was first included in the 
G20’s initial 2010 ACAP and repeated in the 2012 commitment that 
“G20 countries that do not already have whistleblower protections will 
enact and implement whistleblower protection rules.” This draws on 
 
23 
B20, “Driving Growth and Jobs.” 
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principles developed in the working group by the OECD and adopted by 
G20 leaders at the 2011 Cannes Summit.
24
 
 
Unlike beneficial ownership or foreign bribery, maintaining this action 
item is recommended in 2014 by the C20 and T20, but not by the B20 — 
other than perhaps as one element of the “leading practice anti- 
corruption compliance programs: which G20 governments should 
cooperate to ‘incentivise’.” As with other items, this relative lack of focus 
on this issue is clearly not because the task is complete. Recent analysis 
of the state of whistle-blowing rules across the G20 suggests that this 
action item has had considerable success, leading to the adoption of 
new legislative frameworks in a range of countries. But it also finds that, 
like many complex and contentious reforms, much remains to be done 
— especially around rules facilitating whistle-blowing in the private, 
business, and financial sectors.
25 
Australia itself is one country where 
the result is patchy. It passed a relatively sophisticated federal public 
sector whistle-blower protection law in 2013, but still lacks equivalent 
rules for non-government employees.
26
 
 
On the one hand, whistle-blower protection may seem like another niche 
issue whose place in the G20 agenda is hard to comprehend. This is 
especially so when the G20’s own OECD Principles no longer restrict the 
commitment to “corruption whistleblowers,” but recommend a broad 
definition of the wrongdoing to which public interest disclosure laws 
should apply.
27  
But in fact rather than being evidence of a blown-out 
agenda, the uncertainties around whistle-blower legislation confirm the 
need for clearer understanding of why such objectives are strategic in 
the G20 context. 
 
For confirmation of the real relevance of this issue, one needs to look no 
further than the advice of the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The FSB’s 
formation as a coordination body to assist in the monitoring, 
assessment, and management of global economic and financial risk is 
 
…the uncertainties 
around whistle-blower 
legislation confirm the 
need for clearer 
understanding of why 
such objectives are 
strategic in the G20 
context. 
 
 
 
24 
G20, “G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2013-2014.” 
25 
See: Simon Wolfe et al., “Whistleblower Protection Rules in G20 Countries: The Next 
Action Plan — Public Consultation Draft,” (June 2014), 
http://www.griffith.edu.au/conference/corruption-integrity-systems-g20/conference- 
papers-and-reports; Suelette Dreyfus, “The G20 still has a way to go with whistleblower 
protections,” The Conversation, 20 June 2014, http://theconversation.com/g20-still-has- 
a-way-to-go-with-whistleblower-protections-28159. 
26 
See: Senate Economics References Committee of the Australian Parliament, 
“Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,” (Canberra, 
June 2014), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/ASIC/Fi 
nal_Report/~/media/Committees/Senate/committee/economics_ctte/ASIC/Final_Report/ 
report.pdf. See chapter 14 in particular. 
27 
See OECD, “G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan — Protection of Whistleblowers: Study 
on Whistleblower Protection Frameworks, Compendium of Best Practices and Guiding 
Principles for Legislation,” (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-corruption/48972967.pdf. 
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Within the G20’s 
appropriate, core focus 
on overseeing the 
ongoing strengthening of 
financial regulation, 
whistle-blowing becomes 
an efficient and logical 
strategy... 
regarded as one of the major successes of the G20.
28 
Among the 
various post-GFC strategies for timely identification and management of 
unanticipated risks — arguably the single most importance cornerstone 
of resilience for the modern financial system — the FSB’s “Guidance on 
Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture” 
identifies the key indicators of accountability. These include: first, 
“mechanisms … for the sharing of information on emerging, as well as 
low probability, high impact risks, both horizontally across business lines 
and vertically up the institution;” second, “mechanisms … for employees 
to elevate and report concerns when they feel discomfort about products 
or practices, even where they are not making a specific allegation of 
wrongdoing;” and third, “appropriate whistleblowing procedures … to be 
utilised  by  employees  without  any  reprisal,  to  support  effective 
compliance  with  the  risk  management  framework.”
29   
This  focus  on 
whistle-blowing as key to risk management is not new — it simply 
requires a deeper understanding of whistle-blowing’s significance than a 
law    enforcement,    organisational    justice,    or    human    resource 
management  focus. 
30   
Seen  in  this  light,  whistle-blowing  rules  and 
systems become one strategic tool among the various actions for 
improving prudential oversight, corporate governance, and the rule of 
law  recognised  by  sector  leaders  as  basic  to  developing  financial 
markets  and  building  “depth  and  resilience.”
31    
Within  the  G20’s 
appropriate, core focus on overseeing the ongoing strengthening of 
financial regulation, whistle-blowing becomes an efficient and logical 
strategy: 
 
The first G20 leaders’ meeting was a response to a devastating financial 
crisis and the public wanted some assurance that steps were being 
taken to ensure that a similar crisis would be avoided. And it is 
appropriate that the G20 continues to focus on financial regulation, 
because the financial sector has been, and is likely to continue to be, a 
source of economic crises.
32
 
 
 
 
 
28 
See for example: Stephen Grenville, “An Agenda for the 2014 G20 in Brisbane,” The 
Interpreter (blog), http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/08/06/An-agenda-for-the- 
2014-G20-in-Brisbane.aspx. 
29 
Financial Stability Board, “Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial 
Institutions on Risk Culture — A Framework for Assessing Risk Culture,” (Basel, 7 April 
2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/140407.htm. I am grateful to 
Rupert Thorne, Deputy Secretary of the FSB, for pointing me to this guidance at the 
G20 Conference: Strengthening Accountability and Effectiveness in Melbourne on 25 
June 2014. 
30 
Eva Tsahuridu, “Whistleblowing Management is Risk Management,” in 
Whistleblowing and Democratic Values, eds. David Lewis and Wim Vandekerckhove 
(London: International Whistleblowing Research Network, 2011). 
31 
See for example: Graham Hodges, “The Financial Sector’s Role in Asia-Pacific 
Growth,” in Financial Regulation and the G20, G20 Monitor No. 4 (Sydney: Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 2013). 
32 
Mike Callaghan, “Overview,” in Financial Regulation and the G20. 
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INTEGRITY, ANTI-CORRUPTION, OR GOOD 
GOVERNANCE AND SMART REGULATION? WHERE 
TO FROM HERE? 
 
Together, these issues help to understand the persistence of anti- 
corruption as an element of the G20 agenda. They suggest that the G20 
does more than just ‘add value’ to other anti-corruption efforts and that 
integrity and anti-corruption objectives are more than simply 
complementary to securing economic growth and resilience — rather, 
when understood broadly and in context, they are intrinsic to these 
goals. Clearly, such objectives are also not a distraction from G20 core 
business, unless the resilience of the financial and economic system is 
itself a distraction. 
 
The engagement group submissions on the next G20 ACAP also 
reinforce that even if the relevance of past plans has been under- 
theorised, common features help explain the salience of key issues on 
the agenda. Continued attention on hard, core problems at the heart of 
good conduct regulation is consistent with the overarching mission of the 
forum. As Lipsky observes: “the G20 agenda appropriately contains only 
important and consequential issues, and none of them are susceptible to 
rapid resolution.”
33
 
 
Further, as shown above, the issues on the G20 agenda tend to be 
issues where real and new progress can be made, if not solutions found, 
due to the way in which they harness the diversity of the G20 
membership. Whereas the diversity of interests among G20 members is 
frequently cited as a reason why the forum struggles to provide effective 
global economic leadership, this diversity is also capable of working as 
an asset in response to the type of concrete challenges profiled here.
34
 
The items captured to date under the rubric of anti-corruption provide 
several examples of sufficiently shared interests to realise the 
advantages of responses that (if capable of working across most of this 
diverse group) should be capable of spreading worldwide. 
 
What is also clear, however, is that a limited focus on anti-corruption (if 
the role of the ACWG is simply to mirror and support UNCAC- 
implementation among the G20) is insufficient to explain the centrality of 
the agenda. Similarly, the continuing focus on the direct, adverse 
impacts of corruption on growth, while valid, tends to significantly 
undersell its real relevance to the wider G20 mission. Key issues like 
corporate transparency, consistent and effective conduct regulation, and 
whistle-blower protection as a risk management tool all demonstrate that 
the agenda is, in reality, about smart financial regulation and resilience. 
 
There are signs that this  realisation is beginning to penetrate. For 
example, the current ACAP was again framed around the core message 
 
 
…integrity and anti- 
corruption objectives are 
more than simply 
complementary to 
securing economic 
growth and resilience — 
rather, when understood 
broadly and in context, 
they are intrinsic to these 
goals.. 
 
33 
Lipsky, “The Brisbane Summit.” 
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that corruption is “a severe impediment to economic growth,” and the 
2013 Saint Petersburg Declaration noted that it can also “threaten 
financial stability and the economy as a whole.”
35 
The B20’s submission 
to the ACWG in May 2014 described corruption as “a source not only of 
economic waste, but of social and political instability” – even if the B20’s 
final policy recommendations used the words ‘resilience’ and/or ‘stability’ 
only eight times (two of them in simple direct quotes of the Australian 
Government’s 2014 G20 priorities), compared with 48 uses of the word 
‘growth’ in the same text. 
 
Where will a broader understanding of the role of integrity and anti- 
corruption measures take the G20? For Charles Sampford, it suggests 
that the G20 should become the pre-eminent body for mapping, 
analysing, assessing, and improving the integrity systems of all major 
economic sectors as well as for mapping, assessing, and analysing “the 
corruption systems that operate within and across these borders.”
36
 
Arguably, however, this could indeed represent a sidetrack, turning the 
G20 into a new leadership forum for implementing UNCAC and other 
agreements more than it supports the role of economic and financial 
regulation and other elements of good governance in securing growth 
and resilience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…there will remain key 
governance issues which 
cannot be relegated to a 
second-order status if the 
‘first-order’ priorities are 
to be achieved. 
 
Nor, however, is the agenda likely to be served by trying to ‘mainstream’ 
or ‘diffuse’ the G20’s corruption-focused responsibilities into other work 
streams, as suggested by Hugh Jorgensen.
37 
As an experiment in that 
direction, the experience of the Australian-led B20 is salutary, confirming 
that even if the agenda is focused on key economic and financial 
priorities, there will remain key governance issues which cannot be 
relegated to a second-order status if the ‘first-order’ priorities are to be 
achieved. This would remain the case if the ‘first-order’ priorities were 
further reduced from four to three, or even two. Where anti-corruption 
measures are seen by stakeholders as having most promise through the 
G20, it is because they are just as much focused on making regulation 
for positive outcomes and forestalling and suppressing irresponsible and 
damaging economic behaviour as on  detecting and stopping  ‘hard’ 
corruption. 
 
While some realignment of G20 working groups may eventually happen, 
some interim steps are suggested by the C20 and T20 submissions. 
Unlike the B20, the C20 retained the role of an anti-corruption working 
group as one of its four taskforces, but labelled it a ‘governance’ group, 
including issues of tax transparency and open government along with 
corruption. While supporting the call for “a new focused and measurable 
 
35 
G20, “G20 Leaders' Declaration, St Petersburg,” (Saint Petersburg, 6 September 
2013), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html. 
36 
Charles Sampford, “Beyond the Current G20 Anti-Corruption Agenda: Building 
Integrity, not just Fighting Corruption,” in G20 2014: The G20 Brisbane Summit, 
Inequality, Energy and Anti-Corruption, G20 Monitor No. 12 
37 
Jorgensen, “Hard graft.” 
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G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan,” the C20 communiqué also placed this 
within the G20’s commitment to “good governance as underpinning 
capacity for sustainable growth and ensuring economic resilience … 
Good   governance   includes   transparency   and   accountability   to 
citizens.”
38
 
 
Similarly, the T20 submission refined the scope of the plan to recognise 
three overarching objectives, as shown in Table 1. These are: (I) 
cooperation for greater transparency in business, government and 
financial affairs, in recognition that measures that make corruption more 
difficult or impossible are closely related to other measures to strengthen 
financial regulation by reducing and preventing illicit and undesirable 
financial flows (including tax transparency and wider disclosure policies); 
(II) cooperation for stronger, more effective, and more efficient financial 
regulation (including self-regulation), in recognition that corrupt 
behaviour and corruption offences are actually not stand-alone, but part 
of the broader regulatory landscape intended to benefit from cooperation 
for financial system stability and resilience; and (III) cooperation for 
reducing and removing corruption risks from collective growth strategies, 
in recognition that G20 countries can add better value by embedding 
pro-integrity measures in their main fields of economic cooperation than 
by repeating and reinforcing general anti-corruption commitments made 
in other forums. 
 
While the ACWG shares these objectives with other work streams, the 
issues likely to become the most productive core of the next anti- 
corruption plan are ones representing cooperative strategies, rather than 
stand-alone actions, that are intended to address corruption in all its 
forms. With a successor plan now more or less guaranteed, the issues 
canvassed here suggest a more focused agenda is beginning to 
emerge, but one that may need to be recognised as more than a mere 
anti-corruption plan. Instead, it may be a more integrated governance 
reform agenda, supporting a more streamlined G20 agenda overall. In 
any event, the emerging logic of these priorities places the ongoing 
relevance of strategic corruption and integrity objectives and monitoring 
beyond doubt. In the G20 context, efforts to suppress corruption and 
maximise    integrity    appear,    rightly,    to    be    here    to    stay. 
 
…G20 countries can add 
better value by 
embedding pro-integrity 
measures in their main 
fields of economic 
cooperation than by 
repeating and reinforcing 
general anti-corruption 
commitments... 
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TABLE 1: KEY G20 ANTI-CORRUPTION RECOMMENDATIONS — A DIGEST 
 
 
 
Think20 
 
Civil20 
 
Business20 
 
T20 submission 
(May 2014)
1
 
 
to 
 
ACWG 
 
C20 submissions to G20 ACWG and 
C20 Communiqué (June 2014)
2
 
 
B20 Anti-Corruption Working Group Report to the B20 Office and Taskforce 
Chairs (July 2014) and Driving Growth and Jobs: B20 Policy 
Recommendations to the G20 (August 2014)
3
 
 
I) Cooperation for greater transparency in business, government and financial affairs 
1. Enhanced transparency of 
corporate   ownership   and   interests 
(shell companies/ beneficial ownership) 
C20 submission: AntiMoneyLaundering; see also TI position paper on: 
Beneficial ownership. 
*30. … establishment of public registries… to disclose accurate beneficial 
ownership information in open data format of companies, trusts and other 
legal structures to tackle tax avoidance, tax evasion, corruption, money 
laundering and terrorist financing. … Due diligence and ‘know your customer’ 
policies for financial and corporate service advisers should be implemented 
and enforced. 
Harmonised rules on beneficial ownership 
(Priority 5: B20 Submission to the G20 ACWG) 
*To promote integrity and credibility in commerce, all 
G20 governments should: 
20. Endorse the G8 core principles on transparency of ownership and control 
of companies and legal arrangements. 
2.   Cooperation   for   greater   public 
revenue  reporting  (‘publish what  you 
pay’ and  industry transparency 
initiatives) in fields of high development 
significance and corruption risk 
C20 submissions: Private-Sector-Transparency, Integrity, Accountability 
(Revenue transparency); Public-Sector-Transparency, Integrity, Accountability 
(Revenue and budget transparency); see also TI position paper on Natural 
resources. 
*31. … enhanced transparency measures in all sectors to address tax 
evasion and avoidance through the establishment of annual public country by 
country reporting by companies of number of employees, subsidiaries, profit 
and loss, taxes on profits, assets and public subsidies received. Oil, gas and 
mining companies should be required to publish payments made to 
governments on a country-by-country and project-by-project basis. 
(4. G20 governments to commit to begin immediate implementation the 
trade facilitation agreement, with priority given to: 
a. transparency of fees, charges, procedures, time 
frames and regulations; and 
b. implementation of one-stop and automated customs procedures.) 
(*Not among policy recommendations.) 
II) Cooperation for stronger, more effective and more efficient financial regulation (including self-regulation) 
3.  Consistent  and  efficient  protection 
for  corporate  and  financial  system 
whistleblowers 
C20 submission: Detecting-Corruption-W histleblowing; see also TI position 
paper on W histleblower legislation. 
*29. … Comprehensive, loophole-free whistle-blower protection rules must 
be adopted in both the private and public sectors. 
(See best / leading practice anti-corruption compliance programs below) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Prepared by the author with assistance from Jason Sharman and Charles Sampford from Griffith University: T20, “G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group Proposal for 2015-16 priorities,” (Brisbane, 
26 May 2014), http://www.griffith.edu.au/    data/assets/pdf_file/0005/615182/G20-ACWG-T20-submission-for-2015-16-Action-Plan-26May2014.pdf. 
2 
See: C20, “Australian C20 Summit Communique.” 
3 
See: B20, “B20 Anti-Corruption Working Group Report to the B20 Office and Taskforce Chairs,” (July 2014), http://www.b20australia.info/Latest Documents/B20 Anti-Corruption W orking Group 
Report.pdf; B20, “Driving Growth and Jobs.” 
  
 
Think20 Civil20 Business20 
4.   State   support   for   best   practice 
business  integrity  systems  through 
preferential treatment (‘white-listing’) 
C20 submission: Private-Sector-Transparency, Integrity, Accountability 
(Corruption in private sector supply chains). 
(*Not specifically mentioned in Communiqué) 
(See also infrastructure below) 
(Priority 1: Incentivise companies that voluntarily report violations.) 
1. G20 Governments agree to harmonise laws related to anti-corruption 
that  incentivise companies  to build  best  practice compliance  programs 
and  self-report  compliance  breaches;  and  …  form  a  working  group 
consisting of business and enforcement agencies to map jurisdictional 
differences,  propose  regulatory change that  recognises  anti-corruption 
programs and self-reporting, and monitor progress. 
*To     promote     integrity     and     credibility     in     commerce,     all 
G20 governments should: 
18. Agree to harmonise laws related to anti-corruption that incentivise 
companies to build leading practice compliance programs and self-report 
compliance                                                                                        breaches. 
19. Enforce applicable legal frameworks such as the OECD Anti-bribery 
Convention and UN Convention against Corruption and implement or 
strengthen a national independent corruption authority in each jurisdiction to 
monitor and enforce. 
  
5. Consistent foreign bribery 
regulation and strengthened 
enforcement cooperation 
C20 submission: Foreign-Bribery. 
*29. We encourage all G20 members to ratify and fully implement the UN 
Convention Against Corruption and the OECD Convention on Combatting 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. G20 
members must commit to greater consistency and enforcement in foreign 
bribery offences, and enhanced cooperation, including for equity, when G20 
members enter into settlements of foreign bribery prosecutions. 
5. G20 governments ensure that all new trade agreements include specific 
anti-corruption clauses, requiring signatories to uphold the UN Convention 
against  Corruption  and  OECD Anti-Bribery  Convention,  and  install  High 
Level Reporting Mechanisms (3.a). 
8. International Model Investment Treaties (IMITs) should require signatories 
to enforce their anti-corruption and transparency obligations, undertake 
capacity building for public officials, and install high level reporting 
mechanisms to govern the treaty. 
*To promote free movement across borders, G20 governments should: 
11. Ensure preferential trade agreements (PTAs) realise better business 
outcomes by consulting with business, improving transparency and 
consistency and addressing emerging trade issues. 
6.   Joint   implementation   of   realistic 
principles for denial of entry to corrupt 
and allegedly corrupt persons 
C20 submission: Denial-of-Entry; see also TI position paper on Denial of entry. 
(*Not specifically mentioned in Communiqué) 
7. Cooperation for more efficient stolen 
asset recovery 
C20 submission: Asset-recovery-final; see also TI position paper on Asset 
recovery. 
(*Not specifically mentioned in Communiqué) 
  
 
Think20 Civil20 Business20 
III) Cooperation for reducing and removing corruption risks from collective growth strategies 
8. Enhanced cooperation for 
transparency and integrity in 
infrastructure and other procurement 
C20 submission: Public-Sector-Transparency, Integrity, Accountability 
(Transparency in procurement). 
*18. … The G20 should demand PPP arrangements are transparent to enable 
independent monitoring. … 
*19. … G20 should develop common investment standards for best practice 
with regard to community consultation, project planning, governance, 
management, monitoring and evaluation, and safeguards… 
(Priority 2: Review processes and guidelines to promote best practices in 
public procurement) 
6. G20 governments apply best practice procurement processes in all large 
and/or publicly significant infrastructure projects: … 
(Priority  3:  Provide  incentives  in  public  tenders  for  companies  with  a 
demonstrable commitment to anti-corruption policies) 
7. G20 governments incentivise companies bidding for large and/or publicly 
significant  infrastructure  projects  that  have  in  place  best  practice  anti- 
corruption compliance programs… 
*To promote consistent and effective regulation, all 
G20 governments should: 
17.   Implement   transparent   infrastructure   procurement   and   approval 
processes that comply with global leading practice, including a commitment 
to specific time frames for approvals. 
(See also Recommendation 18 above) 
9.  G20  principles  for  consistent,  real- 
time  asset  and  interest  disclosure 
systems for public decision-makers 
C20 submission: Public-Sector-Transparency, Integrity, Accountability (Asset 
disclosure). 
(*Not specifically mentioned in Communiqué) 
 
10. Streamlined, agreed integrity 
system  assessment  frameworks  for 
more efficient monitoring and 
verification  of  country,  sector  and  IGO 
performance 
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CONFERENCE PROGRAM – G20 CONFERENCE: 
STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Wednesday, 25 June 2014, Westin Hotel, Melbourne, Australia 
 
8:45am –9:00am Welcome 
 
Speaker: Michael Fullilove, 
Executive Director, Lowy Institute for 
International Policy 
 
 
 
9:00am – 9:45am Keynote address 
 
John Lipsky, Senior Fellow, The Paul 
H. Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies, Johns Hopkins 
University, and former First Deputy 
Managing Director, IMF 
 
 
 
9:45am – 11:15am Session I: Is the G20 delivering? 
The sherpas’ view 
 
Panel: Mike Callaghan, Director G20 
Studies Centre, Lowy Institute for 
International Policy (Moderator) 
 
Heather Smith, G20 sherpa, 
Australia 
 
Barry Sterland, G20 Finance Deputy, 
Australia 
 
Il Houng Lee, G20 sherpa, Republic 
of Korea 
 
Simon Kennedy, G20 sherpa, 
Canada 
 
Peter Bekx, Director of International 
Economic and Financial Affairs, 
European Commission (DG ECFIN) 
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11:15am – 11:30pm Coffee break 
 
 
 
11:30pm – 1:00pm Session II: The G20 and 
International Organisations – How 
to improve the partnership? 
 
 
 
Panel: Philip Lowe, Deputy 
Governor, Reserve Bank of Australia 
(Moderator) 
 
Gabriela Ramos, Chief of Staff and 
G20 Sherpa, OECD 
 
Siddharth Tiwari, Director, IMF 
(Strategy, Policy, and Review Dept) 
 
Rupert Thorne, Deputy to the 
Secretary-General, FSB 
 
Jeff Chelsky, Lead Economist, World 
Bank 
 
Tim Yeend, Chief of Staff, WTO 
Thierry Soret, Policy Advisor, UNDP 
 
 
1:00pm – 2:30pm Lunch 
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2:30pm – 4:00pm Session III: How can the G20 be 
more responsive to the global 
economic challenges of the 21st 
century? Perspectives from 
business and labour 
 
Panel: John Denton, CEO, Corrs 
Chambers Westgarth (Moderator) 
 
Richard Goyder, CEO Wesfarmers, 
and Chair, B20 
 
Masahiro Kawai, Dean, Asian 
Development Bank Institute 
 
Jennifer Westacott, Chief Executive, 
Business Council of Australia 
 
Tim Lyons, Assistant Secretary, 
ACTU/L20 
 
 
 
4:00pm – 4:30pm Coffee break 
 
 
 
4:30pm – 6:00pm Session IV: What role should civil 
society and think tanks have in 
making the G20 more accountable 
and effective? 
 
Panel: John Kirton, Co-director, G20 
Research Group, University of 
Toronto (Moderator) 
 
Joanne Yates, Australian C20 
sherpa 
 
Huguette Labelle, Chair, 
Transparency International 
Rohinton Mendorha, President, CIGI 
Steve       Price-Thomas,       Deputy 
Advocacy and Campaigns Director: 
Southern Influencing, Oxfam 
International 
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ANNEX 2 
 
 
T20 SUBMISSION: G20 ANTI-CORRUPTION WORKING 
GROUP PROPOSAL FOR 2015-16 PRIORITIES 
 
 
PROPOSED PRIORITIES 
 
I) Cooperation for greater transparency in business, government and 
financial affairs: 
 
1. Enhanced transparency of corporate ownership and 
interests (shell companies/beneficial ownership) 
 
2. Cooperation for greater public revenue reporting (‘publish 
what you pay’ and industry transparency initiatives) in fields of 
high development significance and corruption risk 
 
II) Cooperation for stronger, more effective and more efficient financial 
regulation (including self-regulation): 
 
3. Consistent and efficient protection for corporate and financial 
system whistle-blowers 
 
4. State support for best practice business integrity systems 
through preferential treatment (‘white-listing’) 
 
5. Consistent foreign bribery  regulation and  strengthened 
enforcement cooperation 
 
6. Joint implementation of realistic principles for denial of entry to 
corrupt and allegedly corrupt persons 
 
7. Cooperation for more efficient stolen asset recovery 
 
III) Cooperation  for  reducing  and  removing  corruption  risks  from 
collective growth strategies: 
 
8. Enhanced cooperation for transparency and integrity in 
infrastructure and other procurement 
 
9. G20 principles for consistent, real-time asset and interest 
disclosure systems for public decision-makers 
 
10. Streamlined, agreed integrity system assessment 
frameworks for more efficient monitoring and verification of 
country, sector and intergovernmental organisations’ (IGO) 
performance (accountability). 
 
 
PROPOSING COUNTRY/ORGANISATION 
 
Think20 
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WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? WHY SHOULD THIS BE A PRIORITY 
FOR THE G20? 
Suppression and control of corruption remains vital to ensuring 
sustainable and equitable growth in G20 economies, individually and 
collectively. Broadly defined and understood, corruption represents (1) a 
direct drain on the development resources and growth potential of many 
G20 countries, especially less industrialised countries, (2) a barrier to 
efficient planning, investment and growth through the distortion of 
markets and business ‘playing-fields’, and (3) a risk to international 
financial stability and resilience, given the increasingly interconnected 
nature of the global economy and proven potential for once-isolated 
failures of regulation and integrity to negatively impact the global 
economy as a whole. Greater integrity, on the other hand, enhances 
faith, certainty and confidence in business, government and financial 
systems and can help sustain higher rates of growth. 
 
As a result, leaders should remain committed to ensuring that 
cooperation for economic growth and resilience across the G20 includes 
effective measures for promoting integrity and helping to prevent and 
suppress corruption. However, leaders face four more general problems: 
ensuring these efforts do not unnecessarily duplicate other measures 
and strategies (e.g. United Nations Convention against Corruption - 
UNCAC), keeping these efforts aligned closely with the financial, 
development and regulatory strategies which lie at the heart of G20 
cooperation, for greatest effect, ensuring they are sufficiently focused 
and sustainable to achieve a real impact, over realistic time frames, in 
the often difficult areas in which leaders have pledged action, and the 
need for more effective monitoring and verification of the degree of 
progress towards agreed changes, including diagnostics which point to 
new priority actions as gaps and obstacles are identified. 
 
Few of the above ten priorities are entirely new. Rather they represent 
important, strategic areas where effective action can make a difference, 
especially if it involves strong cooperation between both industrialised 
and less industrialised countries and more concrete collaborative actions 
than currently supported entirely by other forums. They also have strong 
support from other engagement groups such as the C20. 
 
However, many have also been expressed or implied priorities since the 
initial 9-point action plan identified in Seoul.
1 
To the extent they remain 
ongoing issues because solutions are not simple, progress is often 
politically  contentious,  and  changes  require  overcoming  significant 
institutional or other inertia, then these factors demonstrate why they 
remain worthy of high-level commitment by leaders. 
 
It is also clear that to guarantee continued, concrete action, priorities in 
2015-2016 should be more limited in number, aimed at more specific 
 
1 
G20, “G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2010.” 
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deliverable actions and outcomes and selected or refined in line with 
how these can best support or be supported by related areas of G20 
cooperation. The T20 suggests that greater specificity and more realistic 
progress can be achieved both by limiting the commitments and refining 
their scope to focus on action which supports three over-arching 
objectives: I) Cooperation for greater transparency in  business, 
government and financial affairs, in recognition that measures that will 
make business and official corruption more difficult or impossible are 
closely related to other measures to strengthen international financial 
regulation by reducing and preventing illicit and undesirable financial 
flows including tax transparency and wider disclosure policies; II) 
Cooperation for stronger, more effective and more efficient financial 
regulation (including self-regulation), in recognition that corrupt 
behaviour and corruption offences are actually not stand-alone, but part 
of the broader regulatory landscape intended to benefit from cooperation 
for financial system stability and resilience; and III) Cooperation for 
reducing and removing corruption risks from collective growth strategies, 
in recognition that G20 countries can add better value by embedding 
pro-integrity measures in their main fields of economic cooperation than 
by repeating and reinforcing general anti-corruption commitments made 
in other forums. 
 
The Anti-Corruption Working Group shares these objectives with other 
work streams advising G20 leaders and ministers, especially in relation 
to financial regulation, tax, development, and investment and 
infrastructure. To achieve the next stages of real progress, pro-integrity 
and anti-corruption actions should be prioritised which can directly assist 
or be assisted by cooperative strategies in these other areas, rather than 
as stand-alone strategies or actions intended to address corruption in all 
its aspects and forms. 
 
Finally, there needs to be increased quality of accountability surrounding 
the rate and nature of progress in implementing commitments. Reliance 
on self-assessment and reporting, without independent verification and 
evaluation, is insufficient – especially if G20 countries are to be assisted 
with analyses and diagnostics to assist in a more effective identification 
of problems, potential solutions and areas for capacity building. The 
development of more robust evaluation frameworks should thus be 
elevated as a work priority in its own right. 
 
 
WHAT SHOULD THE G20 DO? WHAT IS THE DELIVERABLE? 
 
I) Cooperation for greater transparency in business, government 
and financial affairs: 
 
1. Enhanced transparency of corporate ownership and interests 
(shell companies/beneficial ownership) 
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In 2014 (Brisbane), G20 leaders will consider and hopefully endorse new 
high-level principles for cooperation to prevent misuse and ensure 
transparency of legal entities and arrangements, as a means of 
engaging in, transferring and hiding the proceeds of corruption as well as 
other anti-growth practices, such as profit shifting and tax evasion. The 
focus will be on mechanisms to ensure disclosure of information about 
the real and true owners of all corporate entities, and may include 
agreement to establish new public registers of beneficial ownership 
information. Given the low level of enforcement of existing Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) standards in this area, however, deliverables 
are likely to be best focused on cooperation aimed at: practical actions, 
including technical assistance, to support speedy and consistent 
implementation of the new principles (including establishment of 
registers), establishing and implementing rules to ensure that only 
companies complying with their enhanced ownership disclosure 
requirements may benefit from infrastructure and other public 
procurement processes (see also priorities 4 and 8), requiring the 
licensing of all Trust and Corporate Service Providers (TCSPs), together 
with requirements that they collect adequate beneficial ownership 
(identification) information and make this available to national and 
international law enforcement, collective review of the frequency and 
thoroughness with  which G20  regulatory agencies are  checking  on 
levels of compliance by TCSPs, financial institutions and other licensed 
entities with their identity-collection obligations; and prosecuting 
breaches when found. 
 
2. Cooperation for greater public revenue reporting (‘publish what 
you pay’ and industry transparency initiatives) in fields and 
industries of high development significance and corruption risk 
 
The G20 has a key role to play in helping suppress global corruption 
through support for ‘publish what you pay’ practices and rules, where 
companies publish what they pay to foreign governments on a country- 
by-country and project-by-project basis and governments publish what 
they receive. While the focus of support for this approach has lain in the 
high-risk resources and extractives area, though the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the same principles apply more 
broadly. 
 
However, despite high-level commitments (such as at Saint Petersburg), 
formal engagement of G20 countries with the EITI is low and insufficient 
practical work is being done to address the full implications of how such 
approaches can best be developed and rolled out, including their 
application to corporate subsidiaries and partners. Deliverables are 
likely to be best focused on: increased participation by G20 countries in 
the EITI, more effective mapping and assessment of the ‘corruption 
systems’ affecting highest-risk industries and sectors (building on 
existing World Bank work on sectors vulnerable to corruption risk) in 
order for these to be addressed by best-practice means for tackling 
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corruption networks and systems, and concrete progress towards 
clearer international principles and investigation of how they can be 
efficiently implemented through the international financial system as well 
as at the country level. 
 
II) Cooperation for stronger, more effective and more efficient 
financial regulation (including self-regulation): 
 
3. Consistent and efficient protection for corporate and financial 
system whistle-blowers 
 
Information is the key to regulatory strategies that promote best business 
practice, ensure public integrity, and respond promptly to serious 
problems and risks (whether corruption or other failures). Information 
from employees and other internal sources continues to be the single 
most important avenue for businesses, regulators and where necessary, 
the public, to identify and respond to problems and practices which may 
undermine growth and threaten stability if left unchecked. G20 leaders 
should maintain their commitment to comprehensive whistle-blower 
protection rules, consistent with OECD principles, covering all public 
interest and regulatory information across the public and private sectors. 
However, given the patchy rate of progress to date, deliverables are 
likely to be best focused on cooperation aimed at: identifying the most 
important gaps and barriers in achieving such rules, consistent best- 
practice rules for source protection in the corporate and financial sectors, 
and promoting best-practice business-level (internal and regulatory) 
whistle-blower protection systems (not only retroactive, post-reprisal 
‘protection’ as is often currently the case). 
 
4. State  support  for  best-practice  business  integrity  systems 
through preferential treatment (‘white-listing’) 
 
Business integrity is as crucial to the reduction of corruption and other 
integrity risks to global growth and stability, as public integrity. However, 
most international arrangements, including Anti-Corruption Action Plans 
to date, provide insufficient support to corruption prevention and the 
promotion of integrity (as against law enforcement and reactions to 
corruption). Best-practice regulation already provides relief (e.g. by way 
of defences or reduced penalties) to companies that can show they are 
taking real steps to prevent and suppress corruption, but these principles 
should be extended through a ‘white-listing’ approach in which 
preferential access to finance, markets or contracts is given to 
companies who develop and implement verified anti-corruption 
programs (or business integrity systems). Building on the present 
commitment  to  “explore  …  mechanisms  for  sharing  anticorruption 
expertise among business and governments,”
2 
deliverables should be 
focused on: in partnership with business, civil society and experts, 
development of a clear G20 framework for assessing and evaluating 
 
2 
G20, “G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2013-2014.” 
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business-level integrity systems, and establishment of an expert group to 
investigate and report on a priority range of mechanisms through which 
public decision-making in G20 countries can incentivise companies to 
adopt and enhance these systems. 
 
5. Consistent foreign   bribery   regulation and strengthened 
enforcement cooperation 
 
Combating foreign bribery remains a vital plank in international anti- 
corruption efforts, with the G20 providing an important forum which 
extends this effort beyond the OECD. However, rules remain uneven, 
enforcement remains even more uneven, the equity of settlements is in 
question and information is limited. As well as maintaining a high-level 
commitment to cooperation, deliverables should be focused on: 
cooperation to identify and remove inconsistencies in foreign bribery 
rules, reforms to promote transparency and equity in the distribution of 
settlements, and more detailed information sharing (including 
benchmarking) on levels of enforcement, penalties and outcomes. 
 
6. Joint implementation of realistic principles for denial of entry to 
corrupt and allegedly corrupt persons 
 
Preventing corrupt persons from enjoying the proceeds of their 
corruption in other jurisdictions remains a crucial way of reducing the 
feasibility of grand corruption and thus its major deleterious effects on 
public interest investment and growth. In 2013 (Saint Petersburg), G20 
leaders announced they had established a Denial of Entry Network 
contact list in all G20 jurisdictions to share information on corrupt 
officials. Following this step, deliverables are likely to be best focused 
on cooperation aimed at: making public the contact points for denial-of- 
entry information and coordination, consistent, best-practice legal 
standards for identifying targeted corrupt persons, and cooperative 
evaluation of implementation, especially to identify and deal with risks of 
abuse of process and resolve tensions between this enforcement 
strategy and human rights protection. 
 
7. Cooperation for more efficient stolen asset recovery 
 
The G20 continues to provide important support towards practical reform 
due to its uniquely diverse global membership. Building on the 
benchmarking of G20 countries’ approaches to asset recovery 
conducted in 2013, G20 leaders  should maintain a commitment to 
facilitating the identification and return of stolen assets and corruption 
proceeds, with the aim of increasing the risk of detection and return of 
assets through the international financial system to a level that no 
rational corrupt official will engage in international transfers or seek to 
use other G20 countries as a destination for their proceeds. 
Deliverables should include: expert analysis of different options and 
barriers in securing intergovernmental cooperation to recover assets with 
recommendations for simplifying and strengthening the more effective 
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options, and a monitoring report on the level of achievement of recipient 
countries in the return of assets. 
 
III) Cooperation for reducing and removing corruption risks from 
collective growth strategies: 
 
8. Enhanced   cooperation   for   transparency   and   integrity   in 
infrastructure and other procurement 
 
The G20’s strong focus on growth, including cooperation for the 
provision of infrastructure, necessitates an ongoing commitment to 
ensuring that public procurement processes are not at risk of subversion 
and loss of public value through corruption. While G20 leaders have 
committed in the past to “developing and sharing good practices in the 
field  of  public  procurement  anti-corruption  policies,  measures,  and 
legislation,”
3     
more   concrete   deliverables   are   needed   including: 
cooperation to help identify those G20 countries in greatest need of 
assistance with the reform and development of procurement policies and 
standards, and investigation of mechanisms for using other areas of G20 
financial and regulatory cooperation as triggers for assisting countries to 
adopt these standards (e.g. as prerequisites to continued cooperation in 
other areas). 
 
9. G20  principles  for  consistent,  real-time  asset  and  interest 
disclosure systems for public decision-makers 
 
Commitment to transparency in the true interests of public decision- 
makers remains as important to achieving a corruption-free international 
financial system as does transparency in the true ownership of 
companies (priority 1). In order to promote implementation of the 2012 
Los Cabos Principles on Asset Disclosure, the work of the G20 should 
move beyond simply “considering … current systems and exchanging 
relevant experiences” as contained in the 2013-2014 action plan
4  
and 
seek to lead with concrete initiatives that will improve methods and 
standards of disclosure. Deliverables should focus on: a public report 
on G20 countries’ compliance with the Los Cabos Principles, together 
with the lessons of the information exchange conducted in 2013-2014, 
new technical standards and steps needed by G20 countries to 
implement systems for more consistent, real-time disclosure of assets 
and interests in more accessible and intelligible forms across countries, 
consistent with the type of increased transparency being expected of 
business (priority 1), and technical assistance to inform new and 
improved standards of disclosure and transparency in the management 
of real, perceived and potential conflicts of interest in public life, 
especially using new technology, including online disclosure, official 
diary availability and independently verifiable recordings of meetings 
between officials and others with interests in government decisions. 
 
3 
Ibid. 
4 
Ibid. 
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10. Streamlined, agreed integrity system assessment frameworks 
for more efficient monitoring and verification of country, sector 
and IGO performance (accountability) 
 
At each meeting since 2010, G20 leaders have committed to a range of 
measures that are far-reaching, interrelated, often complex and politically 
difficult to achieve and in which progress is only likely to be measurable 
over an extended time frame. Even with a return to a more focused anti- 
corruption action plan, there is a need for a more structured, ongoing 
program of monitoring and evaluation to ensure the implementation of 
commitments, support their integration as related elements of ‘integrity 
system’ reform and allow G20 policy-makers to efficiently identify and 
address barriers to progress. The development of a more effective 
accountability framework should be elevated in priority. Deliverables 
should focus on: clearer requirements for the identification of action plan 
objectives whose implementation can be objectively measured, enlisting 
experts to develop an accountability and reporting framework tailored to 
the action plan which effectively integrates with, but improves on, other 
frameworks including UNCAC reviews, and the adoption and adaptation 
of an ‘integrity system assessment’ approach to the mapping of 
strengths and weaknesses in the institutional, legal and other 
arrangements of G20 countries, IGOs and international institutions and 
broader sectors (including global finance) as a more holistic means of 
tracking performance against commitments as well as identifying future 
priority areas for action. 
 
 
WHO WILL LEAD THIS WORK? WHAT IS THE TIME FRAME? 
 
The T20 recommends that all commitments be accompanied by clear 
delineation as to who will lead the required work and that more realistic 
time frames be developed for all deliverables to avoid them simply being 
recycled from plan to plan as has occurred on some issues. 
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